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1. Introduction 
Wireless mesh networks (WMNs) have emerged as a promising concept to meet the challenges 
in next-generation networks such as providing flexible, adaptive, and reconfigurable 
architecture while offering cost-effective solutions to the service providers (Akyildiz et al., 
2005). Unlike traditional Wi-Fi networks, with each access point (AP) connected to the wired 
network, in WMNs only a subset of the APs are required to be connected to the wired 
network. The APs that are connected to the wired network are called the Internet gateways 
(IGWs), while the APs that do not have wired connections are called the mesh routers (MRs). 
The MRs are connected to the IGWs using multi-hop communication. The IGWs provide 
access to conventional clients and interconnect ad hoc, sensor, cellular, and other networks 
to the Internet as shown in Fig. 1. 
 
 
Fig. 1. The architecture of a wireless mesh network 
Due to the recent research advances in WMNs, these networks have been used in numerous 
applications such as in home networking, community and neighborhood monitoring, 
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security surveillance systems, disaster management and rescue operations etc (Franklin et 
al., 2007). As there is no wired infrastructure to deploy in the case of WMNs, they are 
considered cost-effective alternative to wireless local area networks (WLANs) and backbone 
networks to mobile clients. The existing wireless networking technologies such as IEEE 
802.11, IEEE 802.15, IEEE 802.16, and IEEE 802.20 are used in the implementation of WMNs.  
As WMNs become an increasingly popular replacement technology for last-mile 
connectivity to the home networking, community and neighborhood networking, it is 
imperative to design an efficient resource management system for these networks. Routing 
is one of the most challenging issues in resource management for supporting real-time 
applications with stringent quality of service (QoS) requirements. However, most of the 
existing routing protocols for WMNs are extensions of protocols originally designed for 
mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) and thus they perform sub-optimally. Moreover, most 
routing protocols for WMNs are designed without security issues in mind, where the nodes 
are all assumed to be honest. In practical deployment scenarios, this assumption does not 
hold. In a community-based WMN, a group of MRs managed by different operators form an 
access network to provide last-mile connectivity to the Internet. As with any end-user 
supported infrastructure, ubiquitous cooperative behavior in these networks cannot be 
assumed a priori. Preserving scarce access bandwidth and power, as well as security 
concerns may induce some selfish users to avoid forwarding data for other nodes, even as 
they send their own traffic through the network. The selfish behavior of an MR degrades the 
performance of a WMN since it increases the latency in packet delivery and packet drops 
and decreases the network throughput. In addition, some nodes may also launch malicious 
packet dropping attacks. Therefore, enforcing cooperation among the nodes in WMNs 
becomes a critical issue and a routing protocol should make use of such a cooperation 
enforcement scheme in order to ensure efficiency in packet forwarding and minimizing 
packet drops (Dong, 2009). To enforce cooperation among nodes and detect malicious and 
selfish nodes in self-organizing networks such as MANETs, various collaboration schemes 
have been proposed in the literature (Santhanam et al., 2008). Most of these proposals are 
based on trust and reputation frameworks which attempt to identify misbehaving nodes by 
an appropriate detection and decision making system, and then isolate or punish them. 
Unfortunately, most of these schemes are not directly applicable for WMNs due to inherent 
differences in characteristics between MANETs and WMNs. Efficient, reliable and secure 
routing protocols for WMNs are clearly in demand.  
Keeping this in mind, this chapter provides a comprehensive overview of security issues in 
WMNs and then particularly focuses on secure routing in these networks. First, it identifies 
security vulnerabilities in the medium access control (MAC) and the network layers. Various 
possibilities of compromising data confidentiality, data integrity, replay attacks and offline 
cryptanalysis are also discussed. Then various types of attacks in the MAC and the network 
layers are discussed. In the MAC layer, attacks such as passive eavesdropping, link layer 
jamming (Law et al., 2005; Brown et al., 2006), MAC spoofing, replay attacks (Mishra et al., 
2002) are discussed in detail. In the network layer, two broad categories of attacks are 
identified: (i) attacks on the control plane and (ii) attacks on the data plane. Among the 
attacks on the control plane, rushing attack (Hu et al., 2003a), wormhole attack (Hu et al., 
2003b), blackhole attack (Al-Shurman et al., 2004), grayhole attack (Sen et al., 2007), Sybil 
attack (Newsome et al., 2004) are discussed. The data plane attacks are launched by the 
selfish and malicious nodes which lead to degradation in the network performance (Zhong 
et al., 2005; Salem et al., 2003). After enumerating the various types of attacks on the MAC 
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and the network layer, the chapter briefly discusses on some of the preventive mechanisms 
for those attacks. After the preliminary discussion on various attacks and their 
countermeasures, the chapter focuses on its major issue- security in routing. It first identifies 
the major security requirements for design of a routing protocol in WMNs. Then various 
existing secure routing protocols for self-organizing networks such as ARAN (Sanzgiri et al., 
2002), SAODV (Zapata et al., 2002), SRP (Papadimitratos et al., 2002), SEAD (Hu et al., 
2002b), ARIADNE (Hu et al., 2002a), SEAODV (Li et al., 2011) etc. are discussed. All these 
protocols are compared in terms of their relative performance and their areas of application. 
After discussing these existing mechanisms, the chapter presents two novel secure routing 
protocols that detect selfish nodes in WMNs and isolate those nodes from the network 
activities so as to maximize the network throughput while providing desired QoS of the 
user application (Sen, 2010a; Sen, 2010b). 
The organization of the chapter is as follows. In Section 2, we discuss various security 
vulnerabilities in different layers of the protocol stack of a WMN. Attacks at the physical, 
MAC, network, and transport layers are discussed in detail, and the countermeasures to 
defend against such attacks are briefly presented. In Section 3, several routing challenges in 
WMNs are highlighted. Section 4 presents some of the well-known existing security 
mechanisms for routing in WMNs. These protocols are also compared with respect to their 
capabilities in defending against different attacks in the network layer of WMNs. In Section 
5, two novel routing protocols for WMNs are presented. These protocols can guarantee 
application QoS in addition to identifying malicious and selfish nodes in the network. 
Section 6 concludes the chapter while identifying some open issues and future research 
directions in designing secure routing protocols for WMNs. 
In summary, the chapter makes the following contributions: 
• It proposes threat models and security goals for secure routing in WMNs. 
• It identifies various possible attacks on different layers of a WMN. 
• It demonstrates how attacks against MANETs and peer-to-peer networks can be 
adapted into powerful attacks against WMNs. 
• It makes security analysis of some of the major existing routing protocols fro WMNs. 
• It presents various defense mechanisms to counter the well-known attacks on the 
routing protocols of WMNs. 
• It presents two novel routing protocols for WMNs. These protocols enhance the routing 
efficiency and the application QoS while providing security in routing. 
• It identifies some open research problems in the area of secure routing in WMNs. 
2. Security Vulnerabilities in WMNs 
Several vulnerabilities exist in the protocols foe WMNs. These vulnerabilities can be 
exploited by the attackers to degrade the performance of the network. The nodes in a WMN 
depend on the cooperation of the other nodes in the network. Consequently, the MAC layer 
and the network layer protocols for these networks usually assume that the participating 
nodes are honest and well-behaving with no malicious or dishonest intentions. In practice, 
however, some nodes in a WMN may behave in a selfish manner or may be compromised 
by malicious users. The assumed trust and the lack of accountability due to the absence of a 
central administrator make the MAC and the network layer protocols vulnerable to various 
types of attacks. In this section, a comprehensive discussion on various types of attacks in 
different layers of the protocol stack of a WMN is provided.  
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2.1 Physical layer attacks 
The physical layer is responsible for frequency selection, carrier frequency generation, signal 
detection, modulation, and data encryption. As with any radio-based medium, the 
possibility of jamming attacks in this layer of WMNs is always there. Jamming is a type of 
attack which interferes with the radio frequencies that the nodes use in a WMN for 
communication (Shi et al., 2004). A jamming source may be powerful enough to disrupt 
communication in the entire network. Even with less powerful jamming sources, an 
adversary can potentially disrupt communication in the entire network by strategically 
distributing the jamming sources. An intermittent jamming source may also prove 
detrimental as some communications in WMNs may be time-sensitive. More complex forms 
of radio jamming attacks have been studied in (Xu et al., 2005), where the attacking devices 
do not obey the MAC layer protocols.  
2.2 MAC layer attacks 
Different types of attacks are possible in the MAC layer of a WMN. Some of the major 
attacks at this layer are: passive eavesdropping, jamming, MAC address spoofing, replay, 
unfairness in allocation, pre-computation and partial matching etc. These attacks are briefly 
described in this subsection.  
i. Passive eavesdropping: the broadcast nature of transmission of the wireless networks 
makes these networks prone to passive eavesdropping by the external attackers within 
the transmission range of the communicating nodes. Multi-hop wireless networks like 
WMNs are also prone to internal eavesdropping by the intermediate hops, whereby a 
malicious intermediate node may keep the copy of all the data that it forwards without 
the knowledge of any other nodes in the network. Although passive eavesdropping 
does not affect the network functionality directly, it leads to the compromise in data 
confidentiality and data integrity. Data encryption is generally employed using strong 
encryption keys to protect the confidentiality and integrity of data. 
ii. Link layer jamming attack: link layer attacks are more complex compared to blind 
physical layer jamming attacks. Rather than transmitting random bits constantly, the 
attacker may transmit regular MAC frame headers (no payload) on the transmission 
channel which conforms to the MAC protocol being used in the victim network (Law et 
al., 2005). Consequently, the legitimate nodes always find the channel busy and back off 
for a random period of time before sensing the channel again. This leads to the denial-
of-service for the legitimate nodes and also enables the jamming node to conserve its 
energy. In addition to the MAC layer, jamming can also be used to exploit the network 
and transport layer protocols (Brown et al., 2006). Intelligent jamming is not a purely 
transmit activity. Sophisticated sensors are deployed, which detect and identify victim 
network activity, with a particular focus on the semantics of higher-layer protocols (e.g., 
AODV and TCP). Based on the observations of the sensors, the attackers can exploit the 
predictable timing behavior exhibited by higher-layer protocols and use offline analysis 
of packet sequences to maximize the potential gain for the jammer. These attacks can be 
effective even if encryption techniques such as wired equivalent privacy (WEP) and WiFi 
protocol access (WPA) have been employed. This is because the sensor that assists the 
jammer can still monitor the packet size, timing, and sequence to guide the jammer. 
Because these attacks are based on carefully exploiting protocol patterns and 
consistencies across size, timing and sequence, preventing them will require 
modifications to the protocol semantics so that these consistencies are removed 
wherever possible. 
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iii. Intentional collision of frames: a collision occurs when two nodes attempt to transmit 
on the same frequency simultaneously (Wood et al., 2002). When frames collide, they 
are discarded and need to be retransmitted. An adversary may strategically cause 
collisions in specific packets such as acknowledgment (ACK) control messages. A 
possible result of such collision is the costly exponential back-off. The adversary may 
simply violate the communication protocol and continuously transmit messages in an 
attempt to generate collisions. Repeated collisions can also be used by an attacker to 
cause resource exhaustion. For example a naïve MAC layer implementation may 
continuously attempt to retransmit the corrupted packets. Unless these retransmissions 
are detected early, the energy levels of the nodes would be exhausted quickly. An 
attacker may cause unfairness by intermittently using the MAC layer attacks. In this 
case, the adversary causes degradation of real-time applications running on other nodes 
by intermittently disrupting their frame transmissions. 
iv. MAC spoofing attack: MAC addresses have long been used as the singularly unique 
layer-2 network identifiers in both wired and wireless LANs. MAC addresses which are 
globally unique have often been used as an authentication factor or as a unique 
identifier for granting varying levels of network privileges to a user. This is particularly 
common in 802.11 WiFi networks. However, today’s MAC protocols (802.11) and 
network interface cards do not provide any safeguards that would prevent a potential 
attacker from modifying the source MAC address in its transmitted frames. On the 
contrary, there is often full support in the form of drivers from manufacturers, which 
makes this particularly easy. Modifying MAC addresses in transmitted frames is 
referred to as MAC spoofing, and can be used by attackers in a variety of ways. MAC 
spoofing enables the attacker to evade intrusion detection systems (IDSs) that are in place. 
Further, today’s network administrators often use MAC addresses in access control 
lists. For example, only registered MAC addresses are allowed to connect to the access 
points. An attacker can easily eavesdrop on the network to determine the MAC 
addresses of legitimate devices. This enables the attacker to masquerade as a legitimate 
user and gain access to the network. An attacker can even inject a large number of 
bogus frames into the network to deplete the resources (in particular, bandwidth and 
energy), which may lead to denial of services for the legitimate nodes. 
v. Replay attack: the replay attack, often known as the man-in-the-middle attack (Mishra et 
al., 2002), can be launched by external as well as internal nodes. An external malicious 
node (not a member of WMN) can eavesdrop on the broadcast communication between 
two nodes (A and B) in the network as shown in Fig. 2. It can then transmit legitimate 
messages at a later stage of time to gain access to the network resources. Generally, the 
authentication information is replayed where the attacker deceives a node (node B in 
Fig. 2) to believe that the attacker is a legitimate node (node A in Fig. 2). On a similar 
note, an internal malicious node, which is an intermediate hop between two 
communicating node, can keep a copy of all relayed data. It can then retransmit this 
data at a later point in time to gain the unauthorized access to the network resources.  
vi. Pre-computation and partial matching attack: unlike the above-mentioned attacks, 
where MAC protocol vulnerabilities are exploited, these attacks exploit the 
vulnerabilities in the security mechanisms that are employed to secure the MAC layer 
of the network. Pre-computation and partial matching attacks exploit the cryptographic 
primitives that are used at MAC layer to secure the communication. In a pre-
 Wireless Mesh Networks 
 
242 
computation attack or time memory trade-off attack (TMTO), the attacker computes a large 
amount of information (key, plaintext, and respective ciphertext) and stores that 
information before launching the attack. When the actual transmission starts, the 
attacker uses the pre-computed information to speed up the cryptanalysis process. 
TMTO attacks are highly effective against a large number of cryptographic solutions. 
On the other hand, in a partial matching attack, the attacker has access to some (cipher 
text, plaintext) pairs, which in turn decreases the encryption key strength, and improves 
the chances of success of the brute force mechanisms. Partial matching attacks exploit 
the weak implementations of encryption algorithms. For example, the IEEE80.11i 
standard for MAC layer security in wireless networks is prone to the sensor hijacking 
attack and the man-in-the-middle attack that exploit the vulnerabilities in IEEE802.1X. 
DoS attacks on the four-way handshake procedure in IEEE 80.211i.  
 
 
Fig. 2. Illustration of MAC spoofing and replay attacks 
DoS attacks may also be launched by exploiting the security mechanisms. For example, the 
IEEE 802.11i standard for MAC layer security in wireless networks is prone to the sensor 
hijacking attack and the man-in-the-middle attack, exploiting the vulnerabilities in IEEE 
802.1X, and DoS attack, exploiting vulnerabilities in the four-way handshake procedure in 
IEEEE 802.11i.  
2.3 Network layer attacks 
The attacks on the network layer can be divided into control plane attacks and data plane 
attacks, and can be active or passive in nature. Control plane attacks generally target the 
routing functionality of the network layer. The objective of the attacker is to make routes 
unavailable or force the network to choose sub-optimal routes. On the other hand, the data 
plane attacks affect the packet forwarding functionality of the network. The objective of the 
attacker is to cause the denial of service for the legitimate user by making user data 
undeliverable or injecting malicious data into the network. We first consider the network 
layer control plane attacks, and then the network layer data plane attacks. 
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i. Control plane attacks: Rushing attacks (Hu et al., 2003a) targeting the on-demand routing 
protocols (e.g., AODV) were among the first exposed attacks on the network layer of 
multi-hop wireless networks. Rushing attacks exploit the route discovery mechanism of 
on-demand routing protocols. In these protocols, the node requiring the route to the 
destination floods the route_request (RREQ) message, which is identified by a sequence 
number. To limit the flooding, each node only forwards the first message that it receives 
and drops remaining messages with the same sequence number. To avoid collisions of the 
messages, the protocol specifies a specific amount of delay between the receiving of a 
route request message by a particular node, and its forwarding by the same node. The 
malicious node launching the rushing attack forwards the RREQ message to the target 
node before any other intermediate node from the source to destination. This can easily be 
achieved by ignoring the specified delay. Consequently, the route from the source to the 
destination includes the malicious node as an intermediate hop, which can then drop the 
packets of the flow thereby launching a data plane DoS attack. 
 
 
Fig. 3. Illustration of wormhole attack launched by nodes M1 and M2 
A wormhole attack has a similar objective albeit it uses a different technique (Hu et al., 
2003b). During a wormhole attack, two or more malicious nodes collude together by 
establishing a tunnel using an efficient communication medium (i.e., wired connection 
or high-speed wireless connection etc.), as shown in Fig. 3. During the route discovery 
phase of the on-demand routing protocols, the RREQ messages are forwarded between 
the malicious nodes using the established tunnel. Therefore, the first RREQ message 
that reaches the destination node is the one forwarded by the malicious nodes. 
Consequently, the malicious nodes are added in the path from the source to the 
destination. Once the malicious nodes are included in the routing path, these nodes 
either drop all the packets resulting in a complete DoS attack, or drop the packets 
selectively to avoid detection. 
A blackhole attack (or sinkhole attack) (Al-Shurman et al., 2004) is another attack that 
leads to denial of service in WMNs. It also exploits the route discovery mechanism of 
on-demand routing protocols. In a blackhole attack, the malicious node always replies 
positively to a RREQ, although it may not have a valid route to the destination. Because 
the malicious node does not check its routing entries, it will always be the first to reply 
to the RREQ message. Therefore, almost all the traffic within the neighborhood of the 
malicious node will be directed towards the malicious node, which may drop all the 
packets, resulting in denial of service. Fig. 4 shows the effect of a blackhole attack in the 
neighborhood of the malicious node where the traffic is directed towards the malicious 
node. A more complex form of the attack is the cooperative blackhole attack where 
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multiple nodes collude together, resulting in complete disruption of routing and packet 
forwarding functionality of the network. The cooperative blackhole attack and the 
prevention mechanism have been studied in (Ramaswamy et al., 2003). 
 
 
Fig. 4. Illustration of blackhole attack launched by node M 
A grayhole attack is a variant of the blackhole attack (Sen et al., 2007). In a blackhole 
attack, the malicious node drops all the traffic that it is supposed to forward. This 
makes detection of the malicious node a relatively easier task. In a grayhole attack, the 
adversary avoids the detection by dropping the packets selectively. A grayhole does not 
lead to complete denial of service, but it may go undetected for a longer duration of 
time. This is because the malicious packet dropping may be considered congestion in 
the network, which also leads to selective packet loss. 
A Sybil attack is the form of attack where a malicious node creates multiple identities in 
the network, each appearing as a legitimate node (Newsome et al., 2004). A Sybil attack 
was first exposed in distributed computing applications where the redundancy in the 
system was exploited by creating multiple identities and controlling considerable 
system resources. In the networking scenario, a number of services like packet 
forwarding, routing, and collaborative security mechanisms can be disrupted by the 
adversary using a Sybil attack. Following form of the attack affects the network layer of 
WMNs, which are supposed to take advantage of the path diversity in the network to 
increase the available bandwidth and reliability. If the malicious node creates multiple 
identities in the network, the legitimate nodes will assume these identities to be distinct 
nodes and will add these identities in the list of distinct paths available to a particular 
destination. When the packets are forwarded to these fake nodes, the malicious node 
that created the identities processes these packets. Consequently, all the distinct routing 
paths will pass through the malicious node. The malicious node may then launch any of 
the above-mentioned attacks. Even if no other attack is launched, the advantage of path 
diversity is diminished, resulting in degraded performance. 
In addition to the above-mentioned attacks, the network layer of WMNs are also prone 
to various types of attack such as: route request (RREQ) flooding attack, route reply (RREP)  
loop attack, route re-direction attack, fabrication attack, network partitioning attack etc. RREQ 
flooding is one of the simplest attacks in which a malicious node tries to flood the entire 
network with RREQ message. As a consequence, this causes a large number of 
Secure Routing in Wireless Mesh Networks   
 
245 
unnecessary broadcast communications resulting in energy drains and bandwidth 
wastage in the network. A routing loop is a path that goes through the same nodes over 
and over again. As a result, this kind of attack will deplete the resources of every node 
in the loop and will lead to isolation of the destination node.  
Fig. 5 describes two instances where route re-direction attack has been launched by a 
malicious node M. In case A, the malicious node M tries to initiate the attack by 
modifying the mutable fields in the routing messages. These mutable fields include hop 
count, sequence numbers and other metric-related fields. The malicious node M could 
divert the traffic through itself by advertising a route to the destination with a larger 
destination sequence number (DSN) than the one it received from the destination. In case 
B, route re-direction attack may be launched by modifying the metric field in the AODV 
routing message, which is the hop-count field in this case. The malicious node M simply 
modifies the hop count field to zero in order to claim that it has a shorter path to the 
destination. 
 
 
Fig. 5. Illustration of route re-direction attack 
An adversary may fabricate false routing messages in order to disrupt routing in the 
network. For example, a malicious node may fabricate a route error (RERR) message in 
the AODV protocol. This may result in the upstream nodes re-initiating the route 
request to the unreachable destination so as to discover and establish alternative routes 
to them leading to energy and bandwidth wastage in the network. In a network 
partitioning attack, the malicious nodes collude together to disrupt the routing tables in 
such a way that the network is divided into disconnected partitions, resulting in denial 
of service for a certain network portion. Routing loop attacks affect the packet-
forwarding capability of the network where the packets keep circulating in loop until 
they reach the maximum hop count, at which stage the packets are simply dropped. 
ii. Data plane attacks:  data plane attacks are primarily launched by selfish and malicious 
(compromised) nodes in the network and lead to performance degradation or denial of 
service of the legitimate user data traffic. The simplest of the data plane attacks is passive 
eavesdropping. Eavesdropping is a MAC layer attack. Selfish behavior of the participating 
WMN nodes is a major security issue because the WMN nodes are dependent on each 
other for data forwarding. The intermediate-hop selfish nodes may not perform the 
packet-forwarding functionality as per the protocol. The selfish node may drop all the 
data packets, resulting in complete denial of service, or it may drop the data packets 
selectively or randomly. It is hard to distinguish between such a selfish behavior and the 
link failure or network congestion. On the other hand, malicious intermediate-hop nodes 
may inject junk packets into the network. Considerable network resources (bandwidth 
and packet processing time) may be consumed to forward the junk packets, which may 
lead to denial of service for legitimate user traffic. The malicious nodes may also inject the 
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maliciously crafted control packets, which may lead to the disruption of routing 
functionality. The control plane attacks are dependent on such maliciously crafted control 
packets. The malicious and selfish behaviors of nodes in WMNs have been studied in 
(Zhong et al., 2005; Salem et al., 2003). 
2.4 Transport layer attacks 
The attacks that can be launched on the transport layer of a WMN are flooding attack and 
de-synchronization attack. Whenever a protocol is required to maintain state at either end of 
a connection, it becomes vulnerable to memory exhaustion through flooding. An attacker 
may repeatedly make new connection request until the resources required by each 
connection are exhausted or reach a maximum limit. In either case, further legitimate 
requests will be ignored. De-synchronization refers to the disruption of an existing 
connection (Wood et al., 2002). An attacker may, for example, repeatedly spoof messages to 
an end host causing the host to request the retransmission of missed frames. If timed 
correctly, an attacker may degrade or even prevent the ability of the end hosts to 
successfully exchange data causing them instead to waste energy attempting to recover 
from errors which never really exist.  
Table 1 presents various types of vulnerabilities in different layers of a WMN and their 
respective defense mechanisms. 
 
Layer Attacks Defense Mechanism 
 
Physical 
Jamming 
Device tampering 
Spread-spectrum, priority messages, 
lower duty cycle, region mapping, 
mode change 
Collision Error-correction code 
Exhaustion Rate limitation  MAC Unfairness Small frames 
Spoofed routing information 
& selective forwarding 
Egress filtering, authentication, 
monitoring 
Sinkhole Redundancy checking 
Sybil Authentication, monitoring, redundancy 
Wormhole Authentication, probing 
Hello Flood Authentication, packet leashes by using geographic and temporal info 
 
Network 
Ack. flooding Authentication, bi-directional link authentication verification 
 
Transport 
Flooding 
De-synchronization 
Client puzzles 
Authentication 
Application Logic errors Buffer overflow 
Application authentication 
Trusted computing 
Table 1. Attacks on different layers of a WMN and their countermeasures 
3. Routing Challenges in WMNs 
In this section, some of the important challenges in designing routing protocols for WMNs 
are discussed. A typical architecture of a hierarchical WMN is presented in Fig. 1. At the top 
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layer, are the Internet gateways (IGWs) which are connected to the wired Internet. They form 
the backbone infrastructure for providing Internet connectivity to the elements in the second 
level. The entities at the second level are called wireless mesh routers (MRs) that eliminate the 
need for wired infrastructure at every MR and forward their traffic in a multi-hop fashion 
towards the IGW. At the lowest level are the mesh clients (MCs) which are the wireless 
devices of the users. Internet connectivity and peer-to-peer communications inside the mesh 
are two important applications for a WMN. Therefore, design of an efficient and low-
overhead routing protocol that avoids unreliable routes, and accurately estimate the end-to-
end delay of a flow along the path from the source to the destination is a major challenge. 
Some of the major challenges in designing routing protocol for WMNs are discussed below: 
i. Measuring link reliability: it has been observed that in wireless ad hoc networks like 
WMNs, nodes receiving broadcast messages introduce communication gray zones 
(Lundgren et al., 2002). In such zones, data messages cannot be exchanged although the 
hello messages reach the neighbors. This leads to disruption in communication among the 
nodes. Since the routing protocols such as AODV and WMR (Xue et al., 2003) relay on 
control packets like RREQ, these protocols are highly unreliable for estimating the quality 
of wireless links. Due to communication gray zone problem, nodes that are able to send 
and receive bi-directional RREQ packets sometimes cannot send/receive data packets at 
high rate. These fragile links trigger link repairs resulting in high control overhead. 
ii. End-to-end delay estimation: an important issue in a routing protocol is end-to-end 
delay estimation. Current protocols estimate end-to-end delay by measuring the time 
taken to route route request (RREQ) and route reply (RREP) packets along the given 
path. However, RREQ and RREP packets are different from normal data packets and 
hence they are unlikely to experience the same levels of delay and loss as data packets. 
It has been observed through simulation that a RREP-based estimator overestimates 
while a hop-count-based estimator underestimates the actual delay experienced by the 
data packets (Kone et al., 2007). The reason for the significant deviation of a RREP-
based estimator from the actual end-to-end delay is interference of signals. The RREQ 
packets are flooded in the network resulting in a heavy burst of traffic. This heavy 
traffic causes inter-flow interference in the paths. The unicast data packets do not cause 
such events. Moreover, as a stream of packets traverse along a route, due to the 
broadcast nature of wireless links, different packets in the same flow interfere with each 
other resulting in per-packet delays. Since the control packets do not experience per-
packet delay, the estimates based on control packet delay deviate widely from the 
actual delay experience by the data packets. 
iii. Reduction of control overhead: since the effective bandwidth of wireless channels vary 
continuously, reduction of control overhead is important in order to maximize 
throughput in the network. Reactive protocols such as AODV and DSR use flooding of 
RREQ packets for route discovery. This consumes a high proportion of the network 
bandwidth and reduces the effective throughput. An important challenge in designing 
a routing protocol for WMNs is to optimize the communication and computation 
overhead of the control messages so that the bandwidth of the wireless channels may be 
used for applications as efficiently as possible. Security and privacy issues bring 
another dimension of complexity. The goal of the protocol designer would be to design 
the security framework in such as way that it involves minimum computational and 
communication overhead. 
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4. Secure Routing Protocols for WMNs 
Extensive work has been done in the area of secure unicast routing in multi-hop wireless 
networks (Hu et al., 2002a; Hu et al., 2002b; Sanzgiri et al., 2002; Marti et al., 2000; 
Papadimitratos et al., 2003a; Awerbuch et al., 2002; Awerbuch et al., 2005). As mentioned in 
Section 2.3, attacks on routing protocols can target either the route establishment process or 
the data delivery process, or both. Ariadne (Hu et al., 2002a) and SRP (Papadimitratos et al., 
2003a) propose to secure on-demand source routing protocols by using hop-by-hop 
authentication techniques to prevent malicious packet manipulations on the route discovery 
process. SAODV (Zapata et al., 2002), SEAD (Hu et al., 2002b), and ARAN (Sanzgiri et al., 
2002) propose to secure on-demand distance vector routing protocols by using one-way 
hash chains to secure the propagation of hop counts. The authors in (Papadimitratos et al., 
2003b) propose a secure link state routing protocol that ensures the correctness of link state 
updates with digital signatures and one-way hash chains. To ensure correct data delivery, 
(Marti et al., 2000) proposes the watchdog and pathrater techniques to detect adversarial 
nodes by having each node monitor if its neighbors forward packets correctly. SMT 
(Papadimitratos et al., 2003a) and Ariadne (Hu et al., 2002a) use multi-hop routing to 
prevent malicious nodes from selectively dropping data. ODSBR (Awerbuch et al., 2002; 
Awerbuch et al., 2005) provides resilience to colluding Byzantine attacks by detecting 
malicious links based on end-to-end acknowledgment-based feedback technique. In HWMP 
(Bahr, 2006; Bahr, 2007), the on-demand node allows two mesh points (MPs) to 
communicate using peer-to-peer paths. This model is primarily used if nodes experience a 
changing environment and no root MP is configured. While the proactive tree building 
mode is an efficient choice for nodes in a fixed network topology, HWMP does not address 
security issues and is vulnerable to a numerous attacks such as RREQ flooding attack, RREP 
routing loop attack, route re-direction attack, fabrication attack, tunnelling attack etc (Li et 
al., 2011). LHAP (Zhu et al., 2003) is a lightweight transparent authentication protocol for 
wireless ad hoc networks. It uses TESLA (Perrig et al., 2000) to maintain the trust 
relationship among nodes, which is not realistic due to TESLA’s delayed key disclosure 
period. In LHAP, simply attaching the TRAFFIC key right after the raw message is not 
secure since the traffic key has no relationship with the message being transmitted. 
In contrast to secure unicast routing, work studying security problems specific to multicast 
routing in wireless networks is particularly scarce, with the notable exception of the work by 
(Roy et al., 2005) and BSMR (Curtmola et al., 2007). The work in (Roy et al., 2005) proposes 
an authentication framework that prevents outsider attacks in tree-based multicast protocol, 
MAODV (Royer et al., 2000), while BSMR (Curtmola et al., 2007) complements the work in 
(Roy et al., 2005) and presents a measurement-based technique that addresses insider attacks 
in tree-based multicast protocols. 
A key point to note is that all of the above existing work in either secure unicast or multicast 
routing considers routing protocols that use only basic routing metrics, such as hop-count 
and latency. None of them consider routing protocols that incorporate high-throughput 
metrics, which have been shown to be critical for achieving high performance in wireless 
networks. On the contrary, many of them even have to remove important performance 
optimizations in existing protocols in order to prevent security attacks. There are also a few 
studies (Papadimitratos et al., 2006; Zhu et al., 2006) on secure QoS routing in wireless 
networks. However, they require strong assumptions, such as symmetric links, correct trust 
evaluation on nodes, ability to correctly determine link metrics despite attacks etc. In addition, 
none of them consider attacks on the data delivery phase.  The work presented in (Dong, 2009) 
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is the first of its kind that encompasses both high performance and security as goals in 
multicast routing and considers attacks on both path establishment and data delivery phases. 
As mentioned in Section 2.3, wireless networks are also subject to attacks such as rushing 
attacks and wormhole attacks. Defenses against these attacks have been extensively studied 
in (Hu et al., 2003b; Hu et al., 2003a; Eriksson et al., 2006; Hu et al., 2004). RAP (Hu et al., 
2003a) prevents the rushing attack by waiting for several flood requests and then randomly 
selecting one to forward, rather than always forwarding only the first one. Techniques to 
defend against wormhole attacks include packet leashes (Hu et al., 2003b) which restricts the 
maximum transmission distance by using time or location information. Truelink (Eriksson et 
al., 2006) which uses MAC level acknowledgments to infer whether a link exists between 
two nodes, and the work in (Hu et al., 2004) that relies on directional antennas are two 
mechanisms for defense against the wormhole attack. 
In the following sub-sections, some of the well-known security protocols for routing in 
WMNs are presented. These protocols are extensions of base routing protocols like AODV, 
DSR etc. and use cryptographic mechanisms for ensuring node authentication, message 
integrity and message confidentiality. 
4.1 Authenticated Routing for Ad Hoc Networks (ARAN) 
Authenticated routing for ad hoc networks (ARAN) protocol (Sanzgiri et al., 2002), is an on-
demand routing protocol that makes use of cryptographic certificates to offer routing 
security. It takes care of authentication, message integrity, and non-repudiation, but expects 
a small amount of prior security coordination among the nodes. In (Sanzgiri et al., 2002), 
vulnerabilities and attacks specific to AODV and DSR protocols are discussed and the two 
protocols are comapred with the ARAN protocol.  
During the route discovery process of ARAN, the source node brodcasts route_request 
(RREQ) packets. The destination node, on receiving the RREQ packets, responds by 
unicasting back a reply packt, called the route_reply (RREP) packet. The ARAN protocol uses 
a preliminary cryptographic certification process, followed by an end-to-end route 
authentication process, which ensures secure route establishment. The protocol requires the 
use of a trusted certificate server T, whose public key is known to all the nodes in the 
network. End-to-end authentication is achieved by the source by having it verify that the 
intended destination was indeed reached. The source trusts the destination to choose the 
return path. The protocol is briefly discussed below. 
Issue of certificates: ARAN utilizes an authenticated trusted server whose public key is 
known to all legitimate nodes in the network. The protocol assumes that keys are generated 
a priori by the server and distributed to all nodes in the network. It does not specify any 
specific key distribution algorithm. On joining the network, each node receives a certificate 
from the trusted server. The certificate received by a node A from the trusted server T looks 
like the following: 
 : [ , , , ]A A A TT A cert IP K t e K+ −→ =  (1) 
In (1), ,AIP  AK + , t, e and TK −  represent the IP address of node A, the public key of node A, 
the time of creation of the certificate, the time of expiry of the certificate, and the private key 
of the server, respectively. 
End-to-end route authentication: the main goal of the end-to-end route authentication 
process is to ensure that the packets reach the current intended destination from the source 
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node. The source node S broadcasts a RREQ (i.e. route discovery) packet destined to the 
destination node D. The RREQ packet contains the packet identifier (route discovery process 
(RDP)), the IP address of the destination (IPD), the certificate of the source node S (CertS), the 
current time (t) and a nonce NS. The process can be denoted as in (2), where, SK −  is the 
private key of the source node S. 
 : [ , , , , ]D S S SS broadcasts RDP IP Cert N t K −→ =  (2) 
Whenever the source sends a route discovery message, it increments the value of the nonce. 
Nonce is a counter used in conjunction with the time-stamp in order to make the nonce 
recycling easier. When a node receives an RDP packet from the source with a higher value 
of the source’s nonce than that in the previously received RDP packets from the same source 
node, it makes a record of the neighbor from which it received the packet, encrypts the 
packet with its own certificate, and broadcasts it further. The process is represented in (3) 
below: 
 : [[ , , , , ] ] ,D S s s A AA broadcasts RDP IP Cert N t K K Cert− −→ =  (3)  
An intermediate node B on receiving an RDP packet from node A removes its neighbor’s 
certificate, inserts its own certificate, and broadcast the packet further. The destination node, 
on receiving an RDP packet, verifies node S’s certificate and the tuple (NS, t) and then replies 
with the route reply (REP). The destination unicasts the REP packet to the source node along 
the reverse path as in (4): 
 : [ , , , , ]S D S DD X REP IP Cert N t K −→ =  (4) 
In (4), node X is the neighbor of the destination node D, which had originally forwarded the 
RDP packet to node D. The REP packet follows the same procedure on the reverse path as that 
followed by the route-discovery packet. An error message is generated if the time-stamp or 
nonce does not match the requirements or if the certificate fails. The error message looks 
similar to the other packets except that the packet identifier is replaced by the ERR message.  
In summary, ARAN is a robust protocol in the presence of attacks such as unauthorized 
participation, spoofed route signaling, fabricated routing messages, alteration of routing 
messages, securing shortest paths, and replay attacks. However, since ARAN uses public-
key cryptography for authentication, it is particularly vulnerable to DoS attacks based on 
flooding the network with bogus control packets for which signature verifications are 
required. As long as a node can’t verify signature at required speed, an attacker can force 
that node to discard some fraction of the control packets it receives. 
4.2 Secure Efficient Ad Hoc Distance Vector (SEAD) routing protocol 
Secure efficient ad hoc distance vector (SEAD) (Hu et al., 2002b) is a secure and proactive ad hoc 
routing protocol based on the destination-sequenced distance vector (DSDV) routing protocol 
(Perkins et al., 1994). This protocol is mainly designed to overcome security attacks such as 
DoS and resource consumption attacks. The operation of the routing protocol does not get 
affected even in the presence of multiple uncoordinated attackers corrupting the routing 
tables. The protocol uses a one-way hash function and does not involve any asymmetric 
cryptographic operation. The basic idea of SEAD is to authenticate the sequence number 
and metrics of a routing table update message using hash chain elements. The receiver also 
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authenticates the sender ensuring that the routing information originates from the correct 
node. The source of each routing update message is also authenticated so as to prevent 
creation of a routing loop by an attacker launching an impersonation attack. 
In the following, first a brief description of the base DSDV protocol is given followed by a 
discussion on the enhancements proposed in the SEAD protocol. 
Distance vector routing: distance vector routing protocols belong to the category of table-
driven routing protocols. Each node maintains a routing table containing the list of all 
known routes to various destination nodes in the network. The metric used for routing is the 
distance measured in terms of hop-count. The routing table is updated periodically by 
exchanging routing information. An alternative to this approach is triggered updates, in 
which each node broadcasts routing updates only if its routing table gets altered. The DSDV 
protocol for ad hoc wireless networks and WMNs uses sequence number tags to prevent the 
formation of loops, to counter the count-to-infinity problem, and for faster convergence. 
When a new route update packet is received for a destination, the node updates the 
corresponding entry in its routing table only if the sequence number on the received update 
is greater than that recorded with the corresponding entry in the routing table. If the 
received sequence number and the previously recorded sequence number are both equal, 
but if the routing update has a new value for the routing metric (distance in number of 
hops), then in this case also the update is effected. Otherwise, the received update packet is 
discarded. DSDV uses triggered updates (for important routing changes) in addition to the 
regular periodic updates. A slight variation of DSDV protocol known as DSDV sequence 
number (DSDV-SQ), initiates triggered updates on receiving a new sequence number update. 
One-way hash function: SEAD uses authentication to differentiate between updates that are 
received from non-malicious nodes and malicious nodes. This minimizes the chances of 
resource consumption attacks caused by malicious nodes. SEAD uses a one-way hash 
function for authenticating the updates. A one-way hash function (H) generates a one-way 
hash chain (h1, h2, …). The function H maps an input bit-string of any length to a fixed 
length bit-string, that is, H : (0, 1)* ? (0, 1)ρ, where ρ is the length in bits of the output bit-
string. To create a one-way hash chain, a node generates a random number with initial value 
x ∈ (0, 1)ρ. h0, the first number in the hash chain is initialized to x. The remaining values in 
the chain are computed using the general formula hi = H(hi-1) for 0 ≤ i ≤ n, for some n. The 
way one-way hash function incorporates security into the existing DSDV-DQ routing 
protocol will now be explained. The SEAD protocol assumes an upper bound on the metric 
used. For example, if the metric used is distance, then the upper bound value m – 1 defines 
the maximum diameter (maximum of lengths of all the routes between a pair of nodes) of 
the ad hoc wireless network or the WMN. Hence, the routing protocol assumes that no route 
of length greater than m hops exists between any two nodes. 
If the sequence of values calculated by a node using the hash function H is given by (h1, h2,… 
hn), where n is divisible by m, then for a routing table entry with sequence number i, let  
kk i
m
= − . If the metric j (distance) used for that routing table entry is, 0 1j m≤ ≤ − , then the 
value of hkm+j is used to authenticate the routing update entry for that sequence number i 
and that metric j. Whenever a route update message is sent, the node appends the value 
used for authentication along with it. If the authentication value used is hkm+j, then the 
attacker who tries to modify this value can do so only if he/she knows hkm+j-1. Since it is a 
one-way hash chain, calculating hkm+j-1 becomes impossible. An intermediate node, on 
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receiving this authenticated update, calculates the new hash value based on the earlier 
updates (hkm+j-1), the value of the metric, and the sequence number. If the calculated value 
matches with the one present in the route update message, then the update is done. 
Otherwise, the received update is just discarded.  
SEAD avoids routing loops unless the loop contains more than one attacker. This protocol 
could be implemented easily with slight modifications to the DSDV protocol. The use of 
one-way hash chain to verify the authentication largely reduces the computational 
complexity. Moreover, the protocol is robust against multiple uncoordinated attacks. The 
main disadvantage is that a trusted entity is needed in the network to distribute and 
maintain the verification element of every node since the verification element of a hash 
chain is detached by a trusted entity. This leads to a single-point of failure in the protocol.  If 
the trusted entity is compromised, the entire network becomes vulnerable. In addition, the 
protocol is vulnerable in situations where an attacker uses the same metric and sequence 
number which has been used in a recent update message and sends a new routing update.  
4.3 Security-Aware Ad Hoc Routing (SAR) protocol  
The security-aware ad hoc routing (SAR) protocol (Yi et al., 2001) uses security as one of the 
key metrics in path finding and provides a framework for enforcing and measuring the 
attributes of the security metric. This framework also enables the use of different levels of 
security for different applications that use SAR for routing. In WMNs, communication 
between two end nodes through possibly multiple nodes is based on the fact that the end 
nodes trust the intermediate nodes. SAR defines level of trust as a metric for routing and as 
one of the attributes for security to be taken into consideration. In SAR, security metric is 
embedded into the RREQ packet and the forwarding behavior of the protocol is 
implemented with respect to the RREQs. The intermediate nodes receive an RREQ packet 
with a particular security metric or trust level. The protocol ensures that a node can only 
process the packet or forward it if the node itself can provide the required security or has 
the required authorization or trust level. If the node cannot provide the required security, 
the RREQ is dropped. If an end-to-end path with the required security attributes can be 
found, a suitably modified RREP is sent from an intermediate node or the destination node. 
The routing protocol based on the level of trust is explained using Fig. 6.  
 
 
Fig. 6. Illustration of use of trust metric of nodes in routing  
Ii
Shortest route
Secure route
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As shown in Fig. 6, two paths exist between the nodes N1 and N2 who want to communicate 
with each other. One of these paths is shorter which passes through private nodes (P1 and 
P2) whose trust levels are low. Hence, the protocol chooses a longer but secure path which 
passes through secure nodes I1, I2, and I3. 
The SAR protocol can be explained using any one of the traditional routing protocols. In this 
Section, SAR protocol has been explained using AODV protocol (Perkins et al., 1999). In the 
AODV protocol, the source node broadcasts a route_request (RREQ) packet to its neighbors. 
An intermediate node, on receiving a RREQ packet, forwards it further if it does not have a 
route to the destination. Otherwise, it initiates route_reply (RREP) packet back to the source 
node using the reverse path traversed by the RREQ packet. In SAR, a certain level of 
security is incorporated into the packet-forwarding mechanism. Here, each packet is 
associated with a security level which is determined by a number calculation method 
(explained later in this section). Each intermediate node is also associated with a certain 
level of security. On receiving a packet, the intermediate node is also associated with a 
certain level of security. On receiving a packet, the intermediate node compares its level of 
security with that defined for the packet. If node’s security level is less than that of the 
packet, the RREQ is simply discarded. If it is greater, the node is considered to be a secure 
node and is permitted to forward the packet in addition to being able to view the packet. If 
the security level of the intermediate node and the received packet are found to be equal, 
then the intermediate node will not be able to view the packet (which can be ensured using 
a proper authentication mechanism); it just forwards the packet further.  
Nodes of equal level of trust distribute a common key among themselves and with those 
nodes having higher levels of trust. Hence, a hierarchical level of security could be 
maintained. This ensures that an encrypted packet can be decrypted (using the common 
key) only by nodes of the same or higher levels of security compared to the level of security 
of the packet. Different levels of trust can be defined using a number calculated based on the 
level of security required. It can be calculated using a number of methods. Since timeliness, 
in-order delivery of packets, authenticity, authorization, integrity, confidentiality, and non-
repudiation are some of the desired characteristics of a routing protocol, a suitable number 
can be defined for the trust level for nodes and packets based on the number of such 
characteristics taken into account. 
The SAR protocol can be easily incorporated into the traditional routing protocols for ad hoc 
wireless networks and WMNs. It could be incorporated into both on-demand and table-
driven routing protocols. The SAR protocol allows the application to choose the level of 
security it requires. But the protocol requires different keys for different levels of security. 
This tends to increase the number of keys required when the number of security levels used 
increases.  
4.4 Secure Ad Hoc On-Demand Distance Vector (SAODV) routing protocol 
In this section, a secure version of the AODV protocol will be described that plugs some 
well-known vulnerabilities of the routing protocol. Before presenting the secure version, a 
brief discussion of the base AODV protocol is presented. 
Ad hoc on-demand distance vector (AODV) routing protocol: it is a reactive routing 
protocol (Perkins et al., 1999; Perkins et al., 2003) for MANETs and WMNs that maintains 
routes only between nodes which need to communicate. The routing messages do not 
contain information about the whole routing path, but only about the source and the 
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destination. Therefore, routing messages do not have an increasing size. It uses destination 
sequence numbers to specify how fresh a route is (in comparison to the others), which is 
used to grant loop freedom. 
Whenever a node needs to send a packet to a destination for which it has no ‘fresh enough’ 
route (i.e., a valid route entry for the destination whose associated sequence number is at 
least as great as the one contained in any RREQ that the node has received for that 
destination), it broadcasts an RREQ message to its neighbors. Each node that receives the 
broadcast message sets up a reverse route towards the originator of the RREQ, unless it has 
a ‘fresher’ one (Fig. 7). When the intended destination (or an intermediate node that has a 
‘fresh enough’ route to the destination) receives the RREQ, it replies by sending an RREP. It 
is important that the only mutable information in an RREQ and in an RREP is the hop-count 
(which is being monotonically increased at each hop). The RREP is unicast back to the 
originator of the RREQ (Fig. 8).  
 
 
Fig. 7. Route request in AODV. S and D are the source and destination nodes respectively   
 
 
Fig. 8. Route reply in AODV. S and D are the source and destination nodes respectively   
At each intermediate node, a route to the destination is set unless the node has a ‘fresher’ 
route than the one specified in the RREP). In the case that the RREQ is replied to by an 
intermediate node (and if the RREQ had set this option), the intermediate node also sends 
an RREP to the destination. In this way, it can be granted that the node path is being set up 
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bi-directionally. In the case that a node receives a new route (by an RREQ or by an RREP) 
and the node already has a route ‘as fresh’ as the received one, the shortest one will be 
updated. Optionally, route_reply acknowledgment (RREP-ACK) message may be sent by the 
originator of the RREQ to acknowledge the receipt of the RREP. An RREP-ACK message has 
no mutable information. In addition to these routing messages, a route_error (RERR) 
message is used to notify the other nodes that certain nodes are not reachable anymore due 
to link breakage. When a node re-broadcasts an RERR, it only adds the unreachable 
destinations to which the node might forward messages. Therefore, the mutable information 
in an RERR is the list of unreachable destinations and the counter of unreachable 
destinations included in the message. It is predictable that, in each hop, the unreachable 
destination list may not change or become a subset of the original one. 
Because AODV has no security mechanisms, malicious nodes can perform many attacks just 
by not following the protocol. A malicious node M can carry out the following attacks 
(among many others) against AODV: 
• Impersonate a node S by forging an RREQ with its address as the originator address. 
• When forwarding an RREQ generated by node S to discover a route to node D, reduce 
the hop count field to increase the chances of being in the route path between S and D 
so that it can analyze the traffic between them.  
• Impersonate a node D by forging an RREP with its address as a destination address. 
• Impersonate a node by forging an RREP that claims that the node is the destination. 
• Selectively drop certain RREQs and RREPs and data packets. This kind of attack is 
especially hard even to detect because transmission errors have similar effect. 
• Forge an RERR message pretending it is the node S and send it to its neighbor D. The 
RERR message has a very high destination sequence number (dsn) for one of the 
unreachable destination, say, U. This might cause D to update the destination sequence 
number corresponding to U with the value dsn and, therefore, future route discoveries 
performed by D to obtain a route to U will fail (because U’s destination sequence 
number will be much smaller than the one stored in D’s routing table). 
• According to the AODV specification (Perkins et al., 1999), the originator of an RREQ 
can put a much bigger destination sequence number than the real one. In addition, 
sequence numbers wrap around when they reach the maximum value allowed by the 
field size. This allows a very easy attack, where an attacker is able to set the sequence 
number of a node to any desired value by just sending two RREQ messages. 
To plug these vulnerabilities the secure version of the AODV protocol is now presented. 
Secure ad hoc on-demand distance vector (SAODV) routing protocol: this protocol has 
been proposed to secure the AODV protocol (Zapata et al. 2002). The idea behind SAODV is 
to use a signature to authenticate most of the fields of RREQs and RREPs and to use hash 
chains to authenticate the hop-count. SAODV designs signature extensions to AODV. 
Network nodes authenticate AODV routing packets with an SAODV signature extension, 
which prevents certain certain impersonation attacks. In SAODV, an RREQ packet includes 
a route request single signature extension (RREQ-SSE). The initiator chooses a maximum hop 
count, based on the expected network diameter, and generates a one-way hash chain of 
length equal to the maximum hop count plus one. This one-way hash chain is used as a 
metric authenticator, much like the hash chain within SEAD protocol (Hu et al., 2002b). The 
initiator signs the RREQ and the anchor of this hash chain; both this signature and the 
anchor are included in the RREQ-SSE. In addition, the RREQ-SSE includes an element of the 
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hash chain based on the actual hop count in the RREQ header.  For sake of explanation, we 
call this value the hop-count authenticator (HCA). For example, if the hash chain values h0, h1, 
….., hN were generated such that hi = H[hi+1], then the hop-count authenticator hi corresponds 
to a hop count of N – i. 
With the exception of the hop-count field and HCA, the fields of the RREQ and RREQ-SSE 
headers are immutable and therefore can be authenticated by verifying the signature in the 
RREQ-SSE extension. To verify the hop-count field in the RREQ header, a node can follow 
the hash chain to the anchor. For example, if the hop-count field is i, then HCA should be 
Hi[hN]. Because the length (N) and the anchor (hN) of this hash chain are included in the 
RREQ-SSE and authenticated by the signature, a node can follow the hash chain and ensure 
that hN = HN-i[HCA].  
When forwarding an RREQ in SAODV, a node first authenticates the RREQ to ensure that 
each field is valid. It then performs duplicate suppression to ensure that it forwards only a 
single RREQ for each route discovery. The node then increments the hop-count field in the 
RREQ header, hashes the HCA, and re-broadcasts the RREQ, together with its RREQ-SSE 
extension. When the RREQ reaches the target, the target checks the authentication in the 
RREQ-SSE. If the RREQ is valid, the target returns an RREP as in AODV. A route reply single 
signature extension (RREP-SSE) provides authentication for the RREP. As in the RREQ, the 
only mutable field is the hop-count; as a result, the RREP is secured in the same way as the 
RREQ. In particular, an RRE-SSE has a signature covering the hash chain anchor together 
with all RREP fields except the hop count. The hop-count is authenticated by an HCA, 
which is also a hash chain element; an HCA hi corresponds to a hop-count of N – i. 
A node forwarding an RREP checks the signature extension. If the signature is valid, then 
the forwarding node sets its routing table entry for the RREP’s original source, specifying 
that packets to that destination should be forwarded to the node from which the forwarding 
node heard the RREP. For example, in Fig. 9, when node B forwards the RREP from node C, 
it sets its next hop for destination node D to C. 
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Fig. 9. Route discovery in SAODV protocol. Node S is discovering a route to node D 
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SAODV allows replies from intermediate nodes through the use of a route reply double 
signature extension (RREP-DSE). An intermediate node replying to an RREQ includes an 
RREP-DSE. The idea here is that to establish a route to the destination, an intermediate node 
must have previously forwarded an RREP from the destination. If the intermediate node has 
stored the RREP and the signature, it can then return the same RREP if the sequence number 
in that RREP is greater than the sequence number specified in the RREQ. However, some of 
the fields of that RREP, in particular the life-time field, are no longer valid. As a result, a 
second signature, computed by the intermediate node, is used to authenticate this field. 
To allow replies based on routing information from an RREQ packet, the initiator includes a 
signature suitable for an RREP packet through the use of an RREQ-DSE. Conceptually, the 
RREQ-DSE is an RREQ and RREP rolled into one packet. To reduce overhead, SAODV uses 
the observation that the RREQ and RREP fields substantially overlap. In particular, the 
RREQ-DSE needs to include some flags, a prefix size, and some reserved fields, together 
with a signature valid for an RREP using those values. When a node forwards an RREQ-
DSE, it caches the route and the signature in the same way as if it had forwarded an RREP.  
SAODV also uses signatures to protect the route error (RERR) message used in route 
maintenance. In SAODV, each node signs the RERR it transmits, whether it’s originating the 
RERR or forwarding it. Nodes implementing SADOV don’t change their destination 
sequence number information when receiving an RERR because the destination doesn’t 
authenticate the destination sequence number. Fig. 10 shows an example of SAODV route 
maintenance. 
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Fig. 10.  Route maintenance in SAODV protocol.  
4.5 Secure Routing Protocol (SRP)  
Papadimitratos et al. (Papadimitratos et al., 2002) have proposed a secure routing protocol 
(SRP) that can be applied to several existing routing protocols (in particular to DSR (Johnson 
et al., 2007)). It is an on-demand source routing protocol that captures the basic features of 
reactive routing. The packets in SRP have extension headers that are attached to RREQ and 
RREP messages. The protocol doesn’t attempt to secure RERR packets; instead it delegates 
the route-maintenance function of the secure route maintenance portion of the secure message 
transmission protocol. SRP uses a sequence number in the RREQs and RREPs to ensure 
freshness, but this sequence number can only be checked at the target. SRP requires a 
security association only between communicating nodes and uses this security association to 
authenticate RREQs and RREPs through the use of message authentication codes (MACs). At 
the target, SRP can detect any modifications of the RREQs, and at the source node, it can 
detect modifications of the RREPs. In the following, the protocol is discussed briefly. 
In SRP, route requests (RREQs) generated by a source node S are protected by message 
authentication codes (MACs) computed using a key shared with the target T. Requests are 
broadcast to all the neighbors of S. Each neighbor that receives a request for the first time 
appends its identifier to the request and re-broadcasts it. The intermediate nodes also 
perform the same actions.  The MAC in the request is not checked because only S and T 
know the key being used to compute it. When the request reaches the target T, its MAC is 
checked by T. If it is valid, then it is assumed by the target that all adjacent pairs of nodes on 
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the path of the RREQ are neighbors. Such paths are called valid or plausible routes. The 
target T replaces the MAC of a valid RREQ by a MAC computed with the same key that 
authenticates the route. This is then sent back (upstream) to S using the reverse route. For 
example, an RREQ that reaches an intermediate node Xj is of the following form: 
 , , 1 2( , , , , , , .......... , )S T rreq j Smsg rreq S T id sn X X X mac=  (5) 
In (5), id is a randomly generated route identifier, sn is a session number and macS  is a MAC 
on (rreq, S, T, id, sn) computed by S using a key shared with T, X1, …….., Xp, T is a 
discovered route, then the route reply (RREP) of the target T has the following form for all 
intermediate nodes Xj, 1 ≤ j ≤ p:  
 , , 1 2( , , , , , , ,...... , )S T rrep p Tmsg rrep S T id sn X X X mac=  (6) 
In (6), macT is a MAC computed by T with the key shared with S on the message field 
preceding it. Intermediate nodes should check the RREP header (including its id and sn) and 
that they are adjacent with two of their neighbors on the route before sending the RREP 
upstream. 
SRP doesn’t attempt to prevent unauthorized modification of fields that are ordinarily 
modified in the course of forwarding these packets. For example, a node can freely remove 
or corrupt the node list of an RREQ packet that it forwards. Since SRP requires a security 
association between communicating nodes, it uses extremely lightweight mechanisms to 
prevent other attacks. For example, to limit flooding, nodes record the rate at which each 
neighbor forwards the RREQ packets and gives priority to REQUEST packets sent through 
neighbor that less frequently forward REQUEST packets. Such mechanisms can secure a 
protocol when few attackers are present. However, such techniques provide secondary 
attacks, such as sending forged RREQ packets to reduce the effectiveness of a node’s 
authentic RREQs. In addition, such techniques exacerbate the problem of greedy nodes. For 
example, a node that doesn’t forward RREQ packets ordinarily achieves better performance 
because it is generally less congested, and it doesn’t need to use its battery power to forward 
packets originated by other nodes. In SRP, a greedy node retains these advantages, and in 
addition, gets a higher priority when it initiates route discovery. 
4.6 ARIADNE: A secure on-demand routing protocol for ad hoc networks  
Ariadne (Hu et al., 2002a) is a secure on-demand routing protocol based on the dynamic 
source routing (DSR) protocol (Johnson et al., 2007). The protocol can withstand node 
compromise and relies only on highly efficient symmetric key cryptography. Ariadne can 
authenticate routing message using one of the three schemes: (i) shared secret between each 
pair of nodes, (ii) shared secrets between communicating nodes combined with broadcast 
authentication using TESLA (Perrig et al., 2001), and (iii) digital signatures.  In this section, 
we discuss Ariadne with TESLA, an efficient broadcast authentication scheme that requires 
loose time synchronization. Using pair-wise shared keys the protocol avoids the need for 
time synchronization but at the cost of higher key-setup overhead. Ariadne discovers routes 
in a reactive (on-demand) manner through route discovery and uses them to source route 
data packets to their destinations. Each forwarding node helps by performing route 
maintenance to discover problems with each selected route. 
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Route discovery: The protocol design is explained in two stages: (i) a mechanism is 
presented that lets the target node verify the authenticity of the RREQ, and (ii) an efficient 
per-hop hashing technique is described that verifies whether any node is missed from the 
node list in the RREQ. In the following, we assume that the initiator node S performs a route 
discovery for target node D and that they share the secret keys KSD and KDS, respectively for 
message authentication in each direction.   
i. Target authenticates route request: To convince the target of the legitimacy of each field in an 
RREQ, the initiator simply includes a message authentication code (MAC) computed with 
the key KSD over unique data – for example, a timestamp. The target can easily verify the 
route requestor’s authenticity and freshness using the shared key KSD. In a route 
discovery, the initiator wants to authenticate each individual node in the node list of the 
RREP. A secondary requirement is that the target can authenticate each node in the node 
list of the RREQ so that it will return an RREP only along paths that contain legitimate 
nodes. Each hop authenticates the new information in the RREQ using its current TESLA 
key. The target node buffers the RREP until intermediate nodes can release the 
corresponding TESLA keys. The TESLA security condition is verified at the target node, 
and the target includes a MAC in the RREP to certify that security condition was met.  
ii. Per-hop hashing: Authenticating data in routing messages isn’t sufficient because an 
attacker could remove a node from the node list in an RREQ. One-way hash functions 
are used to verify that no hop was omitted – an approach that is called per-hop hashing. 
To change or remove a previous hop, an attacker must either hear an RREQ without 
that node listed or must be able to invert the one-way hash function. For efficiency, the 
authenticator may be included in the hash value passed in the RREQ. Fig. 11 shows an 
example of Ariadne route discovery. 
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Fig. 11. Route discovery in Ariadne. Initiator S attempts to discover a route to target D. The 
bold font indicates changed message fields relative to the previous similar message. 
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Route maintenance: Route maintenance in Ariadne is based on the DSR protocol. A node 
forwarding a packet to the next hop along the source route returns an RERR to the packet’s 
original sender if it is unable to deliver the packet to the next-hop after a limited number of 
retransmission attempts. The mechanisms for securing RERRs are discussed in the 
following. However, the case in which attackers to not send the RERRs is not considered.  
To prevent unauthorized nodes from sending RERRs, a mechanism should be in place in 
which the sender needs to authenticate the RERR messages. Each node on the return path to 
the source node forwards the RERR message. If the authentication is delayed – for example, 
when TESLA is used – each node that will be able to authenticate the RERR message buffers 
it until it can be authenticated.  
Avoiding routing misbehavior: Ariadne protocol described above is vulnerable to an attacker 
that happens to be along the discovered route. In particular, a mechanism should be there that 
is able to determine whether the intermediate nodes forward the packets that they are 
requested to forward. To avoid the continued use of malicious routes, the routes are chosen 
based on their prior performance in packet forwarding. The scheme relies on feedback about 
which packets were successfully delivered. The feedback can be received either through an 
extra end-to-end network layer message or by exploiting properties of the transport layers, 
such as TCP with selective acknowledgments (Mathis et al., 1996). This feedback approach is 
somewhat similar to the one used in IPv6 for neighbor unreachability detection (Narten et al., 
2007). A node with multiple routes to a single destination can assign a fraction of packets that 
it originates to be sent along each route. When a substantially smaller fraction of packets sent 
along any particular route is successfully delivered, the node can begin sending a smaller 
fraction of its overall packets to that destination along that route. 
4.7 Security Enhanced AODV protocol    
A security enhanced AODV (SEAODV) routing protocol has been proposed in (Li et al., 2011) 
that employs Blom’s key pre-distribution scheme (Blom, 1985) to compute the pair-wise 
transient key (PTK) through the flooding of enhanced hello message and subsequently uses 
the established PTK to distribute the group transient key (GTK). PTK and GTK are used for 
authenticating unicast and broadcast routing messages respectively. In WMNs, a unique 
PTK is shared by each pair of nodes, while GTK is shared secretly between the node and all 
its one-hop neighbors. A message authentication code (MAC) is attached as the extension to the 
original AODV routing message to guarantee the message’s authenticity and integrity in a 
hop-by-hop fashion. Since SEAODV uses Blom’s key pre-distribution scheme, for the benefit 
of the readers, a brief discussion on the key pre-distribution scheme is presented in the 
following before the secure routing protocol is discussed. 
Blom’s key pre-distribution scheme: Blom’s key pre-distribution is applied for 
implementing key exchange process (Blom, 1985; Du et al., 2003). Blom’s t secure key pre-
distribution scheme is as follows. Blom’s pre-distribution scheme is based on (N, t + 1) 
maximum distance separable (MDS) linear codes (MacWilliams et al., 1977). In this scheme, 
before a network is deployed, a central authority first constructs a (t + 1) x N public matrix P 
over a finite field GF(q), where N is the network size. Then, the central authority selects a 
random (t + 1) x (t + 1) symmetric matrix S over GF(q), where S is secret and only known to 
the central authority. An N x (t + 1) matrix A = (S . P)T is computed, where (.)T denotes the 
transpose operator. The central authority pre-loads the i-th row and i-th column of P to node 
i, for i = 1, 2,…..n. When node i and j need to establish a shared key, they first exchange their 
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columns of P, and then node i computes a key Kij as the product of its own row of A and j-th 
column of P, and node j computes Kji as the product of its own row of A and the i-th column 
of P. Since S is symmetric, it is easy to see that: 
 ( ) ( )T T T T T TK A P S P P P S P P S P A P K= ⋅ = ⋅ ⋅ = ⋅ ⋅ = ⋅ ⋅ = ⋅ =  (7) 
The node pair (i, j) uses Kij = Kji as the shared key. The Blom scheme has a t-secure property. It 
implies that in a network of N nodes, the collusion of less than t +1 nodes cannot reveal any 
key shared by other pairs of nodes. This is because as least t rows of A and t columns of P 
are required to solve the secret symmetric matrix S. The memory cost per node in the Blom 
scheme is t + 1. To guarantee perfect security in a WMN with N nodes, the (N – 2)-secure 
Blom scheme should be used, which means the memory cost per node is N – 1. Hence Blom 
scheme can provide strong security in networks of small size. 
SEAODV protocol: SEAODV is built on AODV protocol. It requires each node in the 
network to maintain two key hierarchies. One is the broadcast key hierarchy, which 
includes all the broadcast keys from its active one hop neighbors. The other hierarchy is 
called unicast hierarchy, which stores all secret pair-wise keys that this node shares with its 
one hop neighbors. Every node uses keys in its broadcast routing messages (e.g., RREQ 
messages) from its one hop neighbors and applies secret pair-wise keys in the unicast 
hierarchy to verify the incoming messages, such as the RREP messages. Various features of 
the protocol are now described. 
i. Enhanced hello messages: in AODV, hello message is broadcast by each node in its 
one-hop neighborhood. In SEAODV, two enhanced hello messages are defined following 
the idea presented in (Jing et al., 2004). Each node embeds its column of the public 
matrix P into its enhanced hello RREQ message. Since each column of P can be 
regenerated by applying the seed (a primitive element of GF(q)) from each node, every 
node only needs to store the seed in order to exchange the public information of matrix 
P. To guarantee bi-directional links, the neighboring nodes who receive hello RREQ  
reply with an enhanced hello RREP. 
ii. Exchange public Seed_P and GTK using enhanced hello message: during the key pre-
distribution phase, every legitimate node in the WMN knows and stores the public 
Seed_P (seed of the column of public matrix P) and the corresponding private row of the 
generated matrix A. The entire exchange process is depicted in three steps: (a) exchange 
of Seed_P of public matrix P, (b) derivation of PTK, and (c) exchange of GTK. In the 
exchange of Seed_P phase, each node looks for its public Seed_P from its key pool, and 
broadcasts the enhanced hello RREQ message. On completion of this step, each node in 
the network possesses the public Seed_P of all of its one-hop neighbors. In the derivation 
of PTK phase, each node uses the Seed_P it received from its neighbors and the node’s 
corresponding private row of matrix A to compute PTK. On completion of this step, 
every node has stored the public Seed_P of its neighbors and has derived the PTK it 
shares with each of its one-hop neighbors. In the exchange of GTK phase, upon receiving 
hello RREQ from node X, node Y (node X’s neighbor) encrypts GTK_Y with its private 
PTK_Y and unicasts the corresponding hello RREP message back to X. The encrypted 
GTK_Y is also attached in the unicast hello RREP message. Once X receives hello RREP 
from Y, X applies its private PTK_X to decrypt the GTK_Y and stores it in the database. 
The same process applies to node Y as well. Eventually, every node possesses the GTK 
keys from all its one-hop neighbors and the group of secret pair-wise PTK keys that it 
shares with each of its one-hop neighbor. 
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Fig. 12. The structure of RREQ message in SEAODV protocol 
iii. Securing route discovery: in order to ensure hop-by-hop authentication, each node 
must verify the incoming message from its one-hop neighbors before re-broadcasting or 
unicasting the messages. The trust relationship between each pair of nodes relies on the 
shared GTK and PTK of the nodes. Route discovery process of SEAODV is similar to 
that of AODV, except for a MAC extension appended to the AODV message. The 
structure of the RREQ in SEAODV is presented in Fig. 12.  The MAC is computed for 
message M using GTK of the node which needs to broadcast a RREQ to its one-hop 
neighbors. When a node wants to discover a route to a designated destination, it 
broadcasts the modified RREQ message to its neighbors. The receiving node computes 
the corresponding MAC value of the received message if the node possesses the GTK of 
the sender. The receiving node then compares the computed MAC with the one it 
received. If there is a match, the received RREQ is considered to be authentic and 
unaltered. The receiving node then updates the mutable field (hop-count in RREQ) and 
its routing table, and subsequently sets up the reverse path back to the source by 
recording the neighbor from which it received the RREQ. Finally, the node computes a 
MAC of the updated RREQ with its GTK and attaches the MAC value to the end of the 
RREQ before the message is re-broadcast to its neighbors. 
iv. Securing route setup:  the destination node or an intermediate node generates a 
modified RREP and unicasts it back to the next hop from which it received the RREQ. 
Since the RREP message is authenticated at each hop using PTKs, an adversary has no 
opportunity to re-direct the traffic. Before unicasting the modified RREP back to the 
originator of the RREQ, the node first needs to check its routing table to identify the 
next hop from which it received the broadcast RREQ. The node then applies PTK that it 
shares with the identified next hop to compute the MAC (PTK, M) and affixes this MAC 
to the end of RREP as shown in Fig. 13.  
 
 
Fig. 13. The structure of RREP message in SEAODV protocol 
Upon receiving the RREP from node Y, node X checks whether PTK_YX is in its group PTK. 
If it is, then node X computes MAC’(PTK_XY, M) and compares it with the MAC(PTK_YX, 
M) it received from node Y. If MAC’(PTK_XY, M) matches MAC(PTK_YX, M), the received 
RREP is considered authentic. Node X then updates the hop-count field in the RREP and its 
own routing table, sets up the forwarding path towards the destination. Node X also 
searches the appropriate PTK that it shares with its next hop to which the new RREP is 
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going to be forwarded to the source. Node X then uses the PTK to construct the new MAC 
and appends it to the new RREP message. Otherwise, the received RREP is deemed to be 
unauthentic and hence dropped. 
v. Securing route maintenance: a node generates an RERR message if it receives data 
packet destined to another node for which it does not have an active route in its routing 
table or the node detects a broken link for the next hop of an active route or a node 
receives a RERR message from a neighbor for one or more active routes. The structure 
of a modified RERR message is presented in Fig. 14. The MAC field in the modified 
RERR message is computed by applying the node’s GTK on the entire RERR packet. On 
receiving the broadcast RERR message from node Y, node X first checks whether it has 
the GTK_Y. If it has, node X then computes MAC’(GTK_Y, M’) and compares it with the 
received MAC. If the two MACs match, node X searches its routing table and tries to 
identify the affected routes (a new group of unreachable destinations) that use node Y 
as its next-hop based on the unreachable destination list received from Y. If no routes in 
node X’s routing table is affected, X simply drops the RERR message and starts 
listening to the channel again. Node X also discards the RERR message if it fails to find 
the GTK_Y or the MAC’(GTK_Y, M’) does not match the one received from node Y. 
 
 
Fig. 14. The structure of RERR message in SEAODV protocol 
Security analysis of SEAODV: SEAODV is vulnerable to RREQ flooding attack. However, 
since it authenticates RREQs from nodes that are in the list of active one-hop neighbors, the 
detection of the attack will be fast. Since GTKs and PTKs are used to secure the broadcast 
and unicast messages, and integrity of the messages are protected by MACs, the protocol is 
robust against RREP routing loop attack and route re-direction attack. RERR fabrication 
attack has minimal impact on SEAODV protocol, since a receiving node authenticates RERR 
messages coming from its active one-hop neighbors only.  Since a malicious node can only 
forward the replayed RERR messages coming from the receiving node’s one-hop neighbors, 
launching of RERR fabrication attack becomes particularly difficult. 
5. Some novel secure routing protocols for WMNs  
In this section, two novel routing protocols for WMNs are presented that can satisfy 
application QoS requirements in addition to providing security in routing. The first protocol 
is based on a reliable estimation of the available bandwidth in wireless links and a robust 
estimation of the end-to-end delay on a routing path. The protocol, while satisfying the 
application QoS, detects selfish nodes in the network and isolates them from the network 
activities so that energy of the nodes and the precious bandwidth of the wireless links are 
optimally utilized. The second protocol is based on an algorithm for detection of selfish 
nodes in a WMN that uses statistical theory of inference and clustering techniques to make a 
robust and reliable classification of the nodes based on their packet forwarding activities. It 
also introduces some additional fields in the packet header for AODV protocol so that 
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detection accuracy is increased. In the following sub-sections the two protocols are 
discussed in detail. 
5.1 A secure and efficient routing protocol for WMNs   
A secure and efficient routing protocol for WMNs has been proposed in (Sen, 2010a) that 
can handle stringent quality of service (QoS) requirements of real-time applications. There 
are several key contributions of the work: (i) It provides an accurate estimation of the end-
to-end delay in a routing path; the estimated value is then used to check whether the routing 
can guarantee the application QoS. (ii) It computes a link quality estimator and utilizes it in 
route selection. (iii) It provides a framework for reliable estimation of available bandwidth 
in a routing path so that flow admission with guaranteed QoS can be made. (iv) It helps in 
identifying and isolating selfish nodes. 
The protocol is a reactive routing protocol, in which during the routing discovery phase, 
each intermediate node uses an admission control scheme to check whether the flow can be 
admitted or not. If a flow is admitted, an entry is created for the flow in a table (called the 
flow table) maintained locally by the node. The important components of the protocol are 
described below: 
i. Estimating reliability of routing paths: every node estimates the reliability of each of 
its wireless links to its one-hop neighbor nodes. For computing the reliability of a link, 
the number of control packets that a node receives in a given time window is used as a 
base parameter. An exponentially weighted moving average (EWMA) method is used to 
update the link reliability estimate. If the percentage of control packets received by a 
node over a link in the last interval of measurement of link reliability is Nt, and if Nt-1 is 
the historical value of the link reliability before the last measurement interval, α = 0.5 is 
the weighting parameter, the updated link reliability (R) is computed using (8): 
 1* (1 ) *t tR N Nα α −= + −  (8) 
Every node maintains estimates of the reliability of each of its links with its neighbors in a 
link reliability table. The reliability for an end-to-end routing path is computed by taking the 
average of the reliability values of all the links on the path. Computation of the link 
reliability values is based on the RREQ packets on the reverse path and the RREP packets on 
the forward path. The use of routing path with the highest reliability reduces the overhead 
of route repair and makes the routing process more efficient. 
ii. Use of network topological information in route discovery: the protocol makes use of 
the knowledge of network topology by utilizing selective flooding of control messages 
in a portion of the network. In this way, broadcasting of control messages is avoided 
and thus the chances of network congestion and disruption of the flows in the network 
are reduced. If both the source and the destination are under the control of the same 
mesh router (Fig. 15), the flooding of the control messages are confined within the 
portion of the network served by the mesh router only. However, if the source and the 
destination are under different mesh routers, the control traffic is limited to the two 
mesh groups. To reduce the control overhead further and enhance the routing 
efficiency, the nodes accept broadcast control messages from only those neighbors 
which have link reliability greater than 0.5 (i.e., on the average 50% of the control 
packets sent from those nodes have been received by the node). This ensures that paths 
with less reliability are not discovered, and hence not considered for routing. 
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Fig. 15. The hierarchical architecture of a WMN 
iii. Estimating end-to-end delay in a routing path: for addressing the issue of differential 
delays experienced by the control and data packets, the protocol makes use of some 
probe packets during the route discovery phase. When a source node receives RREP 
packets from the destination in response to its RREQ, it stores in a table, the records for 
all the RREP packets together with the path through which the packets have arrived at 
it. However, instead of randomly selecting a path to send probe packets to the 
destination, the packets are sent along the path from which RREP messages have 
arrived at the source first. This ensures that the probe packets are sent along the path 
which is likely to induce less end-to-end delay, resulting in a better performance of the 
protocol. The probe packets are identical to the data packets so far as their size, priority, 
and flow rates are concerned. The objective of sending probe packets is to simulate the 
data flow and observe the delay characteristics in the routing path. The number of 
probe packets is kept limited to 2H for a path consisting of H hops to make a trade-off 
between the control overhead and measurement accuracy (Kone et al., 2007). The 
destination node sets a timer after it receives the first probe packet from the source 
node. The timer duration is based on the estimated time for receiving all the probe 
packets and is computed statistically. The destination computes the average delay 
experienced by all the probe packets it has received, and send the computed value to 
the source node piggybacking it on an RREP message. If the computed value is within 
the limit of tolerance of the application QoS, the source selects the route and sends 
packets through it. If the delay exceeds the acceptable limit, the source selects the next 
best path (based on the arrival of RREP packets) from its table and tries once again. 
Since the routing path is set up based on probe packets rather than the naïve RREP 
packets, the protocol has higher route establishment time. However, since the selected 
paths have high end-to-end reliability, the delay and the control overhead are reduced 
because of minimal subsequent route breaks. 
iv. Estimation of available network bandwidth: the protocol estimates the available 
bandwidth in a wireless link using its end-to-end delay and the loss of packets due to 
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congestion. The packet loss due to congestion in the link is estimated as follows. In a 
wireless link packet loss may happen due to tow reasons: (a) loss due to faulty wireless 
links and (b) loss due to network congestion. The radio link control (RLC) layer segments 
an IP packet into several RLC frames before transmission and reassembles them into an 
IP packet at the receiver side. An IP packet loss occurs when any RLC frame belonging 
to an IP packet fails to be delivered. When this happens, the receiver knows that the 
RLC frames re-assembly has failed and the IP packet has been lost due to wireless error. 
Meanwhile, the sender detects retransmission time out (RTO) of the frame and discards 
all the RLC frames belonging to the IP packet. This enables the sender to compute 
packet drop rate in the wireless links. Moreover, using the sequence numbers of the IP 
packets received at the receiver, it is possible to differentiate the packet loss due to link 
error and packet loss due to congestion (Yang et al., 2004). For example, while receiving 
two incoming packets with sequence number i and i +2, if the receiver finds an IP 
packet assembly failure in RLC layer, the packet with sequence number i+1 is lost due 
to wireless channel. Once the packet loss ratio due to congestion (Pcongestion) is estimated, 
the available bandwidth in the wireless link, estrat, is computed as follows (Yang et al., 
2004):  
 PacketSizeestrat
X Y
= +  (9) 
In (9), X and Y are given by: 
 2
3
PcongestionX RTT=  (10) 
 23* min(1,3 * (1 32 )
8 congestion
PcongestionY RTO Pcongestion P= +  (11) 
In (10), RTT is the average round trip time for a control packet. RTO is the retransmission 
time out for a packet, and is computed using (12): 
 * VarRTO RTT k RTT
−−−−− −−−−−= +  (12) 
In (12), RTT
−−−−−
 and VarRTT
−−−−−
 are the mean and variance respectively of RTTs and k is set to 4. 
This bandwidth estimator is employed to dynamically compute the available bandwidth in 
the wireless links on a routing path so that the guaranteed minimum bandwidth for the flow 
is always maintained throughout the application life-time. 
v. Identifying selfish nodes: the protocol also enforces cooperation among the nodes by 
identifying the selfish nodes in the network and isolating them. Selfishness is an 
inherent problem associated with any capacity-constrained multi-hop wireless 
networks like WMNs. A mesh router can behave selfishly owing to various reasons 
such as: (a) to obtain more wireless or Internet throughput, or (b) to avoid path 
congestion. A selfish mesh router increases the packet delivery latency, and also 
increases the packet loss rate. A selfish node while utilizing the network resources for 
routing its own packet, avoids forwarding packets for others to conserve its energy. 
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Identification of selfish nodes is therefore, a vital issue. Several schemes have been 
proposed in the literature to mitigate the selfish behavior of nodes in wireless networks, 
such as credit-based schemes, reputation-based schemes, and game theory-based 
scheme (Santhanam et al., 2008). However, to keep the overhead of computation and 
communication at the minimum, the protocol employs a simple mechanism to 
discourage selfish behavior and encourage cooperation among nodes. To punish the 
selfish nodes, each node forwards packets to its neighbor node for routing only if the 
link reliability of the latter is greater than a threshold value (say, 0.5). Since the link 
reliability of a selfish node is 0, the packets arriving from this node will not be 
forwarded. Therefore, to keep link reliability higher than the threshold, each node has 
to participate and cooperate in routing. The link reliability serves dual purpose of 
enhancing reliability and enforcing node cooperation in the network. 
vi. QoS violation and recovery: the protocol detects failure to guarantee QoS along a path 
with the help of reservation timeouts in flow tables records maintained in the nodes, by 
detection of non-availability of minimum bandwidth as estimated along its outbound 
wireless link. Failure to guarantee QoS may occur in three different scenarios. In the 
first case, a node receives a data packet for which it does not find a corresponding 
record in its flow table. This implies that a reservation time-out has happened for that 
flow. The node, therefore, sends a route error (RERR), to the source which re-initiates 
route discovery. In the second scenario, a destination node detects from its flow table 
records that the data packets received have exceeded the maximum allowable delay 
(Tmax). To restore the path, the destination broadcasts a new RREP back to the source, 
and the source starts re-routing the packets via the same path on which RREP has 
traversed. In the third case, an intermediate node on the routing path may find that the 
estimated bandwidth (using (9)) in its forwarding link is less than the guaranteed 
minimum (Bmin) value. In this case, the intermediate node sends an RERR to the source 
which re-initiates the route discovery process. The real-time estimation of the 
bandwidth in the next-hop wireless link at each node on the routing path makes the 
protocol more robust and reliable compared to most of the existing routing protocols 
for WMNs. For example, the similar protocol presented in (Kone et al., 2007) does not 
employ any bandwidth estimation mechanism at intermediate nodes, and therefore, 
cannot ensure delivery of all packets for every admitted flow in the network. 
5.2 A Trust-based protocol for selfish nodes detection in WMNs 
To address the issue of selfish nodes in a WMN, a scheme has been proposed that uses local 
observations in the nodes for detecting node misbehavior (Sen, 2010b). The scheme is 
applicable for on-demand routing protocol like ad hoc on-demand distance vector (AODV) 
protocol, and uses statistical theory of inference and clustering techniques to make a robust 
and reliable classification (cooperative or selfish) of the nodes based on their neighbors. In 
addition, the scheme introduces additional fields in the packet header of AODV packets so 
that detection accuracy is increased. Since the security protocol works on AODV protocol, a 
brief description of AODV protocol is given before the protocol is described for the benefit 
of the readers. 
AODV protocol and modeling of the state machine: AODV routing protocol uses an on-
demand approach for finding routes to a destination node. It employs destination sequence 
numbers to identify the most recent path. The source node and the intermediate nodes store 
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the next-hop information corresponding to each flow of data packet transmission. The source 
node floods the route request (RREQ) packet in the network when a route is not available for 
the desired destination. It may obtain multiple routes to different destinations from a single 
RREQ. The RREQ carries the source identifier (src_id), the destination identifier (dest_id), the 
source sequence number (src_seq_num), the destination sequence number (dest_seq_num), the 
broadcast identifier (bcast_id), and the time to live (TTL). When an intermediate node receives 
an RREQ, it either forwards the request further or prepares a route reply (RREP) if it has a valid 
route to the destination. Every intermediate node, while forwarding an RREQ, enters the 
previous node address and its bcast_id. A timer is used to delete this entry in case an RREP is 
not received before the timer expires. This helps in storing an active path at the intermediate 
node as AODV does not employ source routing of data packets. When a node receives an 
RREP packet, information of the previous node from which the packet was received is also 
stored, so that data packets may be routed to that node as the next hop towards the 
destination. It is clear that AODV depends heavily on cooperation among the nodes for its 
successful operation. A selfish node can easily manipulate the protocol to minimize its chances 
of being included on routes for it is neither the source nor the destination. It may drop or 
tamper with the RREQ messages to ensure that no routes will ever be selected through it. 
Alternatively, it may drop, delay, or modify the RREP messages so as to prevent the replies 
from reaching the source node. The security protocol proposed in this work attempts to detect 
selfish nodes in a WMN so that these nodes may be isolated from the network. In the 
following, a finite state machine (FSM) model of the AODV protocol is presented which is 
utilized later for describing the security protocol. 
 
 
Fig. 16. The finite state machine of a monitored node 
Finite state machine model: in the security mechanism, with AODV as the underlying 
routing protocol, the set of all messages corresponding to a RREQ flooding and the unicast 
RREP is referred to as a message unit. It is clear that no node in the network can observe all 
the transmission in a message unit. The subset of a message unit that a node can observe is 
referred to as the local message unit (LMU). The LMU for a particular node consists of the 
messages transmitted by that node, the messages transmitted by all its neighbors, and 
messages overheard by the node. The detection of selfish nodes is made on the basis of data 
collected by each node from its observed LMUs. Corresponding to each message 
transmission in an LMU, a node maintains a record of its sender, and the receiver in its 
neighborhood. It also keeps record of the neighbor nodes that receive the RREQ broadcast 
messages sent by the node itself. The messages are assumed to follow the sequence of the 
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AODV protocol. The finite state machine shown in Fig. 16 depicts various states through 
which a neighbor node undergoes for each LMU (Wang et al., 2008). The corresponding 
states for the numbers mentioned in Fig.16 can be found in Table 2.  
 
State Interpretation 
1: init 
2: unexp RREP 
3: rcvd RREQ 
4: fwd RREQ 
5: timeout RREQ 
6: rcvd RREP 
7: LMU complete 
8: timeout RREP 
Initial phase; no RREQ is observed 
Receipt of a  RREP without RREQ observed 
Receipt of a RREQ observed 
Broadcast of a RREQ observed 
Timeout after receipt of RREQ 
Receipt of a RREP observed 
Forwarding of a valid a RREP observed 
Timeout after receipt of a RREP 
Table 2. The states of the finite state machine for a local message unit (LMU) 
To distinguish the finals states, these states are shaded.  Every message transmission by a 
node causes a state transition in each of its neighbor’s finite state machine. The finite state 
machine in one neighbor node gives only a local view of the activities of the node being 
monitored. It does not, in any way, represent the actual behavior of the monitored node. The 
collaborative participation of each neighbor node makes it possible to get an accurate global 
picture regarding the monitored node’s behavior. A node whose activity is being monitored 
by its neighbors is referred to as a monitored node, and its neighbors are referred to as a 
monitor node. Each node plays the dual role of a monitor node and a monitored node for 
each of its neighbors. Each monitor node in the network observes a series of interleaved 
LMUs for a routing session. Each LMU can be identified by the source-destination pair 
contained in an RREQ message. Let us denote the kth LMU observed by a monitor node as 
(sk, dk). The pair (sk, dk) does not uniquely identify an LMU, because source can issue 
multiple RREQs for the same destination. However, since the subsequent RREQs have some 
delays associated with them, we can safely assume that there is only one active LMU (sk, dk) 
in the network at any point of time. At the beginning, a monitored node starts with the state 
1 in its finite state machine. As the monitor node(s) observes the behavior of the monitored 
node by examining the LMUs, it records a sequence of transitions form its initial state 1 to 
one of its possible final states -- 5, 7 and 8. When a monitor node broadcasts an RREQ, it 
assumes that the monitored node has received it. The monitor node, therefore, records a 
state transition 1 ? 3 for the monitored node’s finite state machine. If a monitor node 
observes a monitored node to broadcast an RREQ, then a state transition of 3 ? 4 is 
recorded if the RREQ message was previously sent by the monitor node to the monitored 
node; otherwise a transition of 1 ? 4 will be recorded meaning thereby that the RREQ was 
received by the monitored node from some other neighbor. The transition to a timeout state 
occurs when a monitor node finds no activity by the monitored node for the concerned 
LMU before the expiry of a timer. When a monitor node observes a monitored node to 
forward an RREP, it records a transition to the final state – LMU complete (State No 7). At 
this state, the monitored node becomes a candidate for inclusion on a routing path. 
Fig. 17 depicts an example of LMU observed by the node N during the discovery of a route 
from the source node S to the destination node D indicated by bold lines. Table 3 shows the 
events observed by node N and the corresponding state transitions for each of its three 
neighbor nodes X, Y and Z. When the final state is reached, the finite state machine 
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terminates and the corresponding sequences of state transitions are stored by each node for 
each of its neighbors. When sufficient number of events is collected by a node, a statistical 
analysis is performed to detect the presence of any selfish nodes in the network. 
  
 
Fig. 17. An example of local message unit (LMU) observed by node N 
 
Neighbor Events State changes 
X 
X  broadcasts RREQ 
N  broadcasts RREQ 
N  sends RREP to X 
X  sends RREP to S (overheard) 
1 ? 4 
4 ? 4 
4 ? 6 
6 ? 7 
Y 
Y  broadcasts RREQ 
N  broadcasts RREQ 
Timeout 
1 ? 4 
4 ? 4 
4 ? 5 
Z 
N  broadcasts RREQ 
Z  broadcasts RREQ 
Z  sends RREP to N 
1 ? 3 
3 ? 4 
4 ? 7 
Table 3. The state transitions of the neighbor nodes of node N 
The security algorithm: As mentioned in the previous section, a monitoring node keeps a 
record of state transitions in the finite state machine of a monitored node in each LMU. 
These sequences can be represented as a transition matrix T = [Tij], where Tij is the number 
of times the transition i ? j  is found. The monitor node invokes a detection algorithm every 
W seconds using data from the most recent D = d * W seconds of observations, where d is a 
small integer. The parameter D, called the detection window, should be such that it is possible 
to punish the selfish nodes promptly while maintaining a high level of accuracy.  
In the proposed algorithm, a node is assumed to monitor the activities of its R neighbors 
which are identified by their respective indices 1, 2,….R. Let ( ) ( )r rijfT ⎡ ⎤= ⎣ ⎦   denote the 
observed transition matrix for the rth neighbor, where ( )[ ]rijf  is the number of transitions 
from state i to state j observed in the previous detection window. If m is the number of states 
in the finite state machine in each node, the size of ( )rT  is m x m. Let ( ) ( )( ) 1[ ,... ]
r rr
i imT f f=  
denote the ith row of the transition matrix ( )rT , which shows the transitions out of state i at 
the neighbor node r. If two neighbor nodes r and s have identical distributions 
corresponding to transitions from state i, then one can write ( ) ( )r si iT T≡ .  
To test the hypothesis ( ) ( )r si iT T≡  the Pearson’s χ2 test is used as follows. 
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where ( )riF  and  
( )s
iF  denote total number of transitions for state i in 
( )rT  and  ( )sT  
respectively. 
If the value of χ2 exceeds the value of χ2m-1,α , then the hypothesis ( ) ( )r si iT T≡   is rejected at 
confidence interval α. If we write rsiK  for the event that χ2(i) > χ2m-1,α , then the conditional 
probability ( )( ) ( )|r s rsii iP T T B≡  can be taken as a reasonable estimator of the similarity 
between r and s with respect to the state i. In absence of any prior information, it is 
reasonable to assume that r and s have no similarity in state i and the probability that the 
Pearson test rejects its hypothesis to be 0.5 (Wang et al., 2008). In order to evaluate the 
similarity between r and s for all the m states, (1) is applied to all rows of T(r) and T(s). This 
yields a vector, {i = 1,…..,m}. From the standard Markovian principle one can write: 
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=
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The lower-order terms in the right hand side of (15) are ignored since α  < < 1. For small 
value of α , Lrs monotonically decreases in S(rs), which, as evident from (15), is the number of 
rejections of Pearson’s hypothesis. Therefore, 1 -- Lrs may be taken as the measure of the 
dissimilarity between the neighbor nodes r and s. In presence of noise in the data, however, 
it is found that for two nodes r and s which have Lrs ≈ 1, a third node t may cause 
inconsistency such that Lrt ≉Lst . To avoid this inconsistency in clustering in the proposed 
algorithm, clustering are not computed on the basis of pair-wise dissimilarity. To compute 
dissimilarity between r and s, the L values for all neighbors are computed with respect to r 
and s separately, and the following equation is applied: 
 
2
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It may be observed that the computation of drs does not involve Lrs -- the pair-wise similarity 
index between nodes r and s. In fact, it measures the degree of inconsistency in similarity 
between r and s with all their neighbors. Since, in the computation, contribution of each 
neighbor plays its role, drs presents a robust indicator for dissimilarity between nodes and 
plays a crucial part in computing the clusters (Wang et al., 2008). For clustering, an 
agglomerative hierarchical clustering technique is used. This is a single-linkage approach in 
which each cluster is represented by all of the objects in the cluster, and the similarity 
between two clusters is measured by the similarity of the closest pair of data points 
belonging to different clusters. The cluster merging process repeats until all the objects are 
eventually merged to form one cluster (Eddy et al., 1996). After the nodes are clustered into 
similar sets, the sets are further classified into three groups: (i) a set (G) of cooperative 
nodes, (ii) a set (B) of selfish nodes, and (iii) a set of nodes whose behavior could not be 
ascertained. The cooperation score (Cr) of a node is computed as (Wang et al., 2008): 
 
( ) ( )
, ,
| | | |
m m
r r
ij ij
i j G i j B
r
n n
C
G B
ε ε= −
∑ ∑
 (17) 
The set B is most likely to contain the selfish nodes. To reduce false positives (i.e. wrongly 
identifying a cooperative node as selfish), an ANOVA test is applied. The ANOVA 
approach computes a probability Pk of the random variation among the mean cooperation 
scores of k clusters. A lower value of Pk implies that the clusters actually represent distinct 
differences in their behavior. At each iteration, k clusters are formed and Pk is compared 
with a pre-defined level of significance β. If Pk < β, clusters are believed to be reliably 
reflecting the behavior of the nodes and their classifications are accepted. The cluster with 
lowest mean cooperation score is assumed to contain the selfish nodes. If Pk > Pk-1 , the 
neighbor behavior has not been properly reflected in the cluster formation, which has led to 
the increase in the value of Pk . In this case, all the nodes are classified as cooperative, and 
the next iteration of the algorithm is executed. The confidence parameter β can be tuned so 
as to adjust the alacrity of detection of selfish nodes and rate of false positives (Wang et al., 
2008). In spite of all the above statistical approaches, there is still a possibility of 
misclassification. The proposed algorithm further reduces the probability of 
misclassification by a new cross-checking mechanism. For this purpose, a minor 
modification is suggested in the packet header for AODV routing. Two additional fields are 
inserted in the header of an RREQ packet. These fields are: next_to_source and duplicate_flag 
to indicate respectively the address of the node that is next hop to the source, and whether 
the packet is a duplicate packet which has already been broadcasted by some other nodes in 
the network. In the header of an RREQ packet, in addition to the above two fields, another 
field called next_to_destination is added to indicate the address of the node to which the 
packet must be forwarded in the reverse path. It has been shown in (Kim et al., 2008), with 
the above extra fields, it is possible to detect every instance of selfish behavior in a wireless 
network with 100% detection accuracy, if the following conditions are satisfied: (i) no packet 
loss lost due to interference, (ii) links are bi-directional, (iii) the nodes are stationary, and (iv) 
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the queuing delays are bounded. Since all these conditions cannot be guaranteed in a real-
world deployment, there will be always some detection inaccuracy.  
Table 4 presents a list of vulnerabilities in different layers of the protocol stack of WMNs 
and the security protocols for defending those attacks. Table 5 compares the secure routing 
protocols discussed in this chapter with respect to various mechanisms these protocols use. 
6. Conclusion 
WMNs have become the focus of research in recent years, owing to their great promise in 
realizing numerous next-generation wireless services. Driven by the demand for rich and 
high-speed content access, recent research on WMNs has focussed on developing high 
performance communication protocols, while the security of the proposed protocols have 
received relatively little attention. However, given the wireless and multi-hop nature of the 
communication, WMNs are subject to a wide range of security threats. In this chapter, a 
large number of security issues at various layers of WMNs have been presented with a 
particular focus on the network layer. In addition, some of the major routing security 
mechanisms for WMNs currently existing in the literature have been presented and 
compared with respect to their strengths and weaknesses. A few novel secure routing 
mechanisms that take into account application QoS while detecting malicious and selfish 
nodes are also discussed. Although, researchers have done substantial contributions in the 
area of routing security in WMNs, there are still many challenges that remain to be 
addressed. First, efficient (i.e., lightweight) and robust authentication protocols for the mesh 
routers (MRs) need to be designed which involves scalable key management techniques. 
Second, for reliability in routing, energy-aware and secure multi-path routing protocols are 
in demand. Third issue is on strategic deployment of hop integrity protocols in WMNs. Hop 
integrity protocols are open to incremental deployment, and the security they provide 
increases with the number of  pairs of hop integrity-equipped mesh routers, because an 
adversary will have less venues to launch his/her attacks. However, due to 
hardware/software compatibility and efficiency consideration, it may be worthwhile to 
consider a strategic deployment scheme. For example, few hotspots in the network may be 
required to install static hop integrity, in which hop integrity is always turned on; other 
spots in the network can install dynamic hop integrity, in which hop integrity is randomly 
turned on and off. Fourth, efficient security mechanism should be designed for defending 
against tunnelling attack, in which two malicious nodes advertise in such a way as if they 
have a very reliable link between them. This is achieved by tunnelling AODV messages 
between them. No security scheme exists so far that can detect this attack promptly and 
efficiently. Fifth, appropriate security protocols should be designed for hybrid networks. In 
many deployment situations, WMNs are designed to be integrated with other types of 
networks, such as wired networks and cellular networks. Addressing attacks in hybrid 
environment also presents an interesting future direction. Such networks are vulnerable to a 
wider range of attacks than its individual network components. For example, a mesh 
network for wireless Internet access can be targeted with DDoS attacks launched from the 
Internet. The scarcity of bandwidth resource on WMNs further exacerbates the severity of 
such attacks. On the other hand, hybrid networks possess additional resources and 
opportunities for defending against attacks. For example, WMNs connected to the wired 
networks, it is possible to leverage the high bandwidth, low latency wired links, and deploy 
powerful computers on the wired networks to defend against attacks. Sixth, a balanced 
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Attack Targeted layer in the protocol stack Protocols 
Jamming  Physical and MAC layers 
Frequenscy hopping spread spectrum (FHSS), 
Direct sequence spread spectrum (DSSS) 
Wormhole Network layer Packet Leashes (Hu, 2003b) 
Blackhole Network layer SAR (Yi, 2001)  
Grayhole Network layer GRAYSEC (Sen, 2007), SAR (Yi, 2001) 
Sybil Network layer SYIBSEC (Newsome, 2004) 
Selective packet 
dropping Network layer 
SMT (Papadimitratos, 2003a), ARIADNE (Hu, 
2002a), Sen (2010a), Sen (2010b) 
Rushing Network layer 
ARAN (Sanzgiri, 2002), SAR (Yi, 2001), SEAD 
(Hu, 2002b), ARIADNE (Hu, 2002a), SAODV 
(Li, 2001), SRP (Papadimitratos, 2002), SEAODV 
(Li, 2011) 
Byzantine Network layer ODSBR (Awerbuch, 2002) 
Resource depletion Network layer SEAD (Hu, 2002b) 
Information 
disclosure Network layer SMT (Papadimitratos, 2003a) 
Location disclosure Network layer SRP (Papadimitratos, 2002) 
Routing table 
modification Network layer 
ARAN (Sanzgiri, 2002), SAR (Yi, 2001), SRP 
(Papadimitratos, 2002), SEAD (Hu, 2002b), 
ARIADNE (Hu, 2002a), SAODV (Li, 2001), 
SEAODV (Li, 2011) 
Repudiation Application layer ARAN (Sanzgiri, 2002) 
Denial of service  Multi-layer SRP (Papadimitratos, 2002), SEAD (Hu, 2002b), ARIADNE (Hu, 2002a) 
Impersonation Multi-layer ARAN (Sanzgiri, 2002), SEAD (Hu, 2002b), SEAODV (Li, 2011) 
 
 
 
Table 4. Different attacks on WMN protocol stack and protocols for defending the attacks 
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Table 5. Comparative analysis of various secure routing protocols for WMNs 
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network coding system needs to be designed for high performance secure routing 
(Ahlswede et al., 2000). Existing network coding systems are vulnerable to a wide range of 
attacks besides the most well-known packet pollution attacks (Yu et al., 2008). Many of the 
weaknesses of existing system designs lie in their single focus in performance optimizations. 
A more balanced approach, which can provide improved security guarantees, is crucial for 
the actual adoption of network coding in real-world applications. A future direction of 
research is to uncover the security implications of different design and optimization 
techniques, and explore balanced system designs with network coding that achieve 
appropriate tradeoffs between security and performance suitable for different application 
requirements. Finally, multi-layer (i.e. cross-layer) security protocols should be developed 
that address network vulnerabilities in multiple layers of the protocol stack to provide 
robust and highest level of protection to mission-critical network deployments. 
7. References 
Ahlswede, R.; Cai, N.; Li, S.- Y. & Yeung, R. (2000). Network information flow. IEEE 
Transactions on Information Theory, Vol 46, No 4, pp. 1204 – 1216. 
Akyildiz, I.F.; Wang, X.; & Wang, W. (2005). Wireless mesh networks: a survey. Journal of 
Computer Networks, Vol 47, No 4, pp. 445 – 487. 
Al-Shurman, M.; Yoo, S. & Park, S. (2004). Black hole attack in mobile ad hoc networks. 
Proceedings of the 42nd Annual Southeast Regional Conference, Huntsville, Alabama, 
USA. 
Awerbuch, B.; Holmer, D.; Nita-Rotaru, C. & Rubens, H. (2002). An on-demand secure 
routing protocol resilient to Byzantine failure. Proceedings of ACM Workshop on 
Wireless Security (WiSe), ACM Press. 
Awerbuch, B.; Curtmola, R.; Holmer, D.; Nita-Rotaru, C. & Rubens, H. (2005). On the 
survivability of routing protocols in ad hoc wireless networks. Proceedings of ICST 
International Conference on Security and Privacy in Communication Networks 
(SecureComm). 
Bahr, M. (2006). Proposed routing for IEEE 802.11s WLAN mesh networks. Proceedings of the 
2nd Annual International Wireless Internet Conference (WICON), pp. 133 – 144, Boston, 
MA, USA. 
Bahr, M. (2007). Update on the hybrid wireless mesh protocol 80.11s. Proceedings of the IEEE 
International Conference on Mobile Ad Hoc and Sensor Systems, (MASS’07), pp. 1 – 6. 
Blom, R. (1985). An optimal class of symmetric key generation systems. Proceedings of the 
EUROCRYPT’84, pp. 335 – 338. 
Brown, T.; James, J. & Sethi, A. (2006). Jamming and sensing of encrypted wireless ad hoc
 networks. Proceedings of ACM MOBIHOC’06. 
Curtmola, R. & Nita-Rotaru, C. (2007). BSMR: Byzantine-resilient secure multicast routing in 
multi-hop wireless networks. Proceedings of IEEE Communications Society Conference 
on Sensor, Mesh and Ad Hoc Communications and Networks (SECON). 
Dong, J. (2009). Secure and robust communication in wireless mesh networks. Doctoral 
Thesis, Purdue University, Indiana, USA. 
Secure Routing in Wireless Mesh Networks   
 
277 
Du, W.; Deng, J.; Han, Y. S. & Varshney, P. K. (2003). A pair-wise key pre-distribution 
scheme for wireless sensor networks. ACM Transactions on Information and System 
Security, Vol 8, No 2, pp. 228 – 258. 
Eddy, W.F.; Mockus, A. & Oue, S. (1996). Approximate single linkage cluster analysis of 
large datasets in high dimensional spaces. Journal of Computational Statistics and 
Data Analysis, Vol 23, pp. 29 – 43. 
Eriksson, J.; Krishnamurthy, S. V. & Faloutsos, M. (2006). Truelink: a practical 
countermeasure to the wormhole attack in wireless networks. Proceedings of IEEE 
International Conference on Network Protocols (ICNP). 
Franklin, A. A. & C. S. R. Murthy. (2007). An introduction to wireless mesh networks. Book 
chapter in:  Security in Wireless Mesh Networks, Zhang, Y.; Zheng, J. & Hu, H. (eds.), 
CRC Press, pp. 3 – 44. 
Hu, L. & Evans, D. (2004). Using directional antennas to prevent wormhole attacks. 
Proceedings of ISOC Symposium of Network and Distributed Systems Security 
(NDSS’04). 
Hu, Y.-C.; Perrig, A. & Johnson, D. (2002a). Ariadne: a secure on-demand routing protocol 
for ad hoc networks. Proceedings of ACM Annual International Conference on Mobile 
Computing (MOBICOM’02), pp. 21 – 38, Atlanta, GA, USA.  
Hu, Y.-C. ; Johnson, D.B. & Perrig, A. (2002b). SEAD : secure efficient distance vector routing 
for mobile wireless ad hoc networks. Proceedings of IEEE Workshop on Mobile 
Computing Systems and Applications (WMCSA’02), pp. 3 – 13.  
Hu, Y.-C. ; Perrig, A. & Johnson, D.B. (2003a). Rushing attacks and defense in wireless ad 
hoc network routing protocols. Proceedings of the ACM Workshop on Wireless Security 
(WiSe’03) in conjunction with MOBICOM’03, pp. 30 – 40.  
Hu, Y.-C.; Perrig, A. & Johnson, D.B. (2003b). Packet leashes: a defense against wormhole 
attacks in wireless ad hoc networks. Proceedings of IEEE INFOCOM’03. 
Jing, X. & Lee, M. J. (2004). Energy-aware algorithms for AODV in ad hoc networks. 
Proceedings of Mobile Computing and Ubiquitous Networking, pp. 466 – 468, Yokosuka, 
Japan. 
Johnson, D. B. (2007). The dynamic source routing protocol (DSR) for mobile ad hoc 
networks for IPv4. IETF Request for Comments, RFC4728.  
Kim, H. J. & Peha, J. M. (2008). Detecting selfish behavior in a cooperative commons. 
Proceedings of IEEE DySPAN, pp. 1 -12. 
Kone, V.; Das, S.; Zhao, B. Y. & Zheng, H. (2007). Quorum: quality of service in wireless 
mesh networks. Journal of Mobile Networks and Applications, Vol 12, No 5, pp. 
358 – 369. 
Law, Y.; Hoesel, L.; Doumen, J.; Hartel, P. & Havinga, P. (2005). Energy-efficient link-layer 
jamming attacks against wireless sensor network MAC protocols. Proceedings of the 
3rd ACM Workshop on Security of Ad Hoc and Sensor Networks (SASN’05). 
Li, C.; Wang, Z. & Yang, C. (2011). Secure routing for wireless mesh networks. International 
Journal of Network Security, Vol 13, No 2, pp. 109 – 120.  
Lundgren, H.; Nordstrom, E. & Tschudin, C. (2002). The gray zone problem in IEEE 802.11b 
based ad hoc networks, M2CR, Vol 6, No 2, pp. 104 – 105. 
 Wireless Mesh Networks 
 
278 
MacWillams, F. J. & Sloane, N. J. A. (1977). The Theory of Error Correction Codes. North-
Holland, New York. 
Marti, S.; Guili, T.; Lai, K. & Baker, M. (2000). Mitigating routing misbehavior in mobile ad 
hoc networks. Proceedings of ACM Annual International Conference on Mobile 
Computing (MOBICOM). 
Mathis, M.; Mahdavi, J.; Floyd, S. & Romanow, A. (1996). TCP selective acknowledgment 
options. IETF RFC 2018, October 1996. 
Mishra, A. & Arbaugh, W.A. (2002). An initial security analysis of the IEEE 802.1X standard. 
Technical Report, University of Maryland, USA. 
Narten, T.; Nordmark, E.; Simpson, W. & Soliman, H. (2007). Neighbor discovery for IP 
version 6 (IPv6). IETF RFC 4861, September 2007. 
Newsome, J. ; Shi, E. ; Song, D. & Perrig, A. (2004). The Sybil attack in sensor networks: 
analysis and defenses. Proceedings of the 3rd International Symposium on Information 
Processing in Sensor Networks (IPSN’04), pp. 259 – 268. 
Papadimitratos, P. & Haas, Z.J. (2002). Secure routing for mobile ad hoc networks. 
Proceedings of the SCS Communication Networks and Distributed Systems Modelling and 
Simulation Conference (CNDS’02). 
Papadimitratos, P. & Hass, Z. J. (2003a). Secure data transmission in mobile ad hoc 
networks. Proceedings of ACM Workshop on Wireless Security (WiSe), pp. 41 – 50. 
Papadimitratos, P. & Hass Z. J. (2003b). Secure link state routing for mobile ad hoc 
networks. Proceedings of the Symposium on Applications and the Internet Workshops 
(SAINT’03 Workshops). 
Papadimitratos, P. & Haas, Z. J. (2006). Secure route discovery of QoS-aware routing in ad 
hoc networks. Proceedings of IEEE Sarnoff Symposium.  
Perkins, C.E. & Belding-Royer, E.M. (1999). Ad hoc on-demand distance vector routing. 
Proceedings of the IEEE Workshop on Mobile Computing Systems and Applications, pp. 
90 – 100. 
Perkins, C. E.; Belding-Royer, E. M. & Das, S. R. (2003). Ad hoc on-demand distance vector 
(AODV). Internet Request for Comments, RFC 3561. 
Perkins, C. E. & Bhagwat, P. (1994). Highly dynamic destination-sequenced distance-vector 
routing (DSDV) for mobile computers. Proceedings of ACM SIGCOMM, pp. 234 – 
244. 
Perrig, A.; Canetti, R.; Tygar, J. D. & Song, D. (2000). Efficient authentication and signing of 
multicast streams over lossy channels. Proceedings of the IEEE Symposium on Security 
and Privacy, pp. 56 – 73.  
Perrig, A.; Canetti, R.; Song, D. & Tygar, D. (2001). Efficient and secure source authentication 
for multicast. Proceedings of the Network and Distributed System Security Symposium 
(NDSS’01). 
Ramaswamy, S.; Fu, Huirong.; Sreekantaradhya, M.; Dixon, J. & Nygard, K.E. (2003). 
Prevention of cooperative black hole attacks in wireless ad hoc networks. 
Proceedings of the International Conference on Wireless networks, pp. 570 – 575. 
Roy, S.; Addada, V. G.; Setia, S. & Jajodia, S. (2005). Securing MAODV: attacks and 
countermeasures. Proceedings of IEEE Communications Society Conference on Sensor, 
Mesh and Ad Hoc Communications and Networks (SECON).  
Secure Routing in Wireless Mesh Networks   
 
279 
Royer, E. M. & Perkins, C. E. (2000). Multicast ad-hoc on-demand distance vector (MAODV) 
routing. Internet Draft, July 2000. 
Salem, N.B.; Buttyan, L.; Hubaux, J.-P. & Jacobson, M. (2003). A charging and rewarding 
scheme for packet forwarding in multi-hop cellular networks. Proceedings of IEEE 
MOBIHOC’03, pp. 1324. 
Santhanam, L.; Xie, B. & Agrawal, D. (2008). Selfishness in mesh networks: wired multi-hop 
MANETs. IEEE Journal of Wireless Communications, Vol 15, No 4, pp. 16 – 23. 
Sanzgiri, K.; Dahill, B.; Levine, B. N.; Shields, C. & Belding-Royer, E. M. (2002). A secure 
routing protocol for ad hoc networks. Proceedings of IEEE International Conference on 
Network Protocols (ICNP’02), pp. 78 – 87. 
Sen, J. (2010a). An efficient and reliable routing protocol for wireless mesh networks. 
Proceedings of the International Conference on Computational Sciences and its 
Applications (ICCSA’10), Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS), Springer-
Verlag, Heidelberg, Germany, Vol 6018, pp. 246-257, Fukuaka, Japan. 
Sen, J. (2010b). A trust-based detection algorithm of selfish packet dropping nodes in a peer-
to-peer wireless mesh networks. Proceedings of the International Conference on Recent 
Trends in Network Security and Applications, Communications in Computer and 
Information Science (CCIS), Springer-Verlag, Heidelberg, Germany, Vol 89, Part 2, 
pp. 528 – 537.  
Sen, J.; Chandra, M. G.; Harihara, S. G.; Reddy, H. & Balamuralidhar, P. (2007). A 
mechanism for detection of grayhole attack in mobile ad hoc networks. Proceedings 
of the 6th IEEE International Conference on Information, Communications, and Signal 
Processing (ICICS’07), Singapore.  
Shi, E. & Perrig, A. (2004). Designing secure sensor networks. IEEE Wireless Communication 
Magazine, Vol 11, No 6, pp. 38 – 43. 
Wang, B. ; Soltani, S. ; Shaprio, J.K. ; Tan, P.-N. & Mutka, M. (2008). Distributed detection of 
selfish routing in wireless mesh networks. Technical Report- MSU-CSE-06-19, 
Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Michigan State University. 
Wood, A. D. & Stankovic, J. A. (2002). Denial of service in sensor networks. IEEE Computer, 
Vol 35, No. 10, pp. 54 – 62. 
Xu, W.; Trappe, W.; Zhang, Y. & Wood, T. (2005). The feasibility of launching and detecting 
jamming attacks in wireless networks. Proceedings of ACM MobiHoc’05. 
Xue, Q.; & Ganz, A. (2002). QoS routing for mesh-based wireless LANs. International Journal 
of Wireless Information Networks, Vol 9, No 3, pp. 179 – 190. 
Yang, F.; Zhang, Q.; Zhu, W. & Zhang, Y.-Q. (2004). End-to-end TCP-friendly streaming 
protocol and bit allocation for scalable video over wireless Internet. IEEE Journal on 
Selected Areas in Communications, Vol 22, No 22, pp. 777- 790. 
Yi, S.; Naldurg, P. & Kravets, R. (2001). Security-aware ad hoc routing for wireless networks. 
Proceedings of ACM MobiHoc’01, pp. 299 – 302. 
Yu, Z.; Wei, Y.; Ramkumar, B. & Guan, Y. (2008). An efficient signature-based scheme for 
securing network coding against pollution attacks. Proceedings of the IEEE Conference 
of the IEEE Communications Society (INFOCOMM’08), Phoenix, AZ, April, 2008. 
Zapata, M. G.; & Asokan, N. (2002). Securing ad hoc routing protocols. Proceedings of ACM 
Workshop on Wireless Security (WiSe). 
 Wireless Mesh Networks 
 
280 
Zhong, S.; Li, L. E.; Liu, Y. G. & Yang, Y. R. (2005). On designing incentive-compatible 
routing and forwarding protocols in wireless ad-hoc networks: an integrated 
approach using game theoretical and cryptographic techniques. Proceedings of IEEE 
MOBICO’05, pp. 117 – 131. 
Zhu, S.;  Xu, S.;  Setia, S. & Jajodia, S. (2003). LHAP: a lightweight hop-by-hop authentication 
protocol for ad-hoc networks. Proceedings of ICDCS International Workshop on Mobile 
and Wireless Network, pp. 749 – 755, Providence, Rhode Island. 
Zhu, T. & Yu, M. (2006). A dynamic secure QoS routing protocol for wireless ad hoc 
networks. Proceedings of IEEE Sarnoff Symposium, pp. 1 – 4. 
